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##Bauddha Bharati Series-30##

svopajn~avr%ttisahita#

vigrahavya#vartani#

[a#m%gla-hindibha#s%a#nuva#dasahita#]

pradha#nasampa#daka:

sva#mi# dva#rika#da#sas*a#stri#

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##VIGRAHAVYAVARTANI##

##of

ACHARYA NAGARJUNA

with his own commentary

(swopajna vritti)

&

With English Translation

by

Dr. S. Mookerjee

Ex. Director of

Nava Nalanda mahavihara, Nalanda (Bihar)

&

Hindi Transalation

by

Swami Dwarika Das Shastri

BAUDDHA BHARATI

VARANASI

1994##

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svopajn~avr%ttisahita#

vigrahavya#varttani#

tasya#:

a#m%glabha#s%aya#'nuva#daka:

d%a#.c^ sa#taka#rimukharji#

nava na#landa# maha#viha#rasya pra#ktananides*aka:,

na#landa#-(biha#ra)

hindi#bha#s%aya#'nuva#dakas*ca

sva#mi# dva#rika#da#sas*a#stri#

##[DD]##

bauddhabha#rati#

va#ra#n%asi#

2050 vai^] 1994 khris%t%a#bda: [2537 bu^

@004

praka#s*aka:

C bauddhabha#rati#,

po^ ba#.c^ 1049,

va#ra#n%asi#-1 (u^ pra^)

pina : 221001

##Publication

C Bauddha Bharati

Post Box. 1049

VARANASI-1 (U.P.)

Pin : 221001##

prathama sam%skaran%a

1994

##First Edition

1994##

##[DD]##

mudraka :

sa#dhana# presa

jagatagam%ja,

va#ra#n%asi#-2

##Printed at

SADHANA PRESS

Jagatganj

VARANASI-2##

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praka#s*aki#yam

ya: s*u#nyata#m% prati#tyasamutpa#dam% madhyama#m% pratipadam% ca |

eka#rtha nijaga#da pran%ama#mi tamapratimasambuddham ||

ma#nya# vidvanmu#rdhanya#: !

1968 tame khris%t%a#bde'sma#bhirabhinavapaddhatya# bauddhasa#hityasya praka#s*ana#ya

praca#ra#ya ca bauddhabha#rati#paris%adiyam% stha#pita# | tata a#rabhya#naya# paris%ada#

bauddhasa#hityasya#karabhu#ta#ni tattvasam%graha-prama#n%ava#rttika-abhidharmakos*a-nya#ya-

bindu-va#danya#ya-madhyamakas*a#stra- bodhicarya#vata#ra-maha#ya#nasu#tra#lan*ka#ra-

abhidha#nappadi#pika#-majjhimanika#ya#dyaneka#ni (29) sudurlabha#ni grantharatna#ni

pra#ka#s*yama#ni#ta#ni | seyam% bauddhabha#rati#pars%adanena kus*alakarman%a# sarvatra bauddhajagati

supratis%t%hita#'bhu#diti suviditameva sames%a#m |

ida#ni#masminneva krame'naya# pars%ada#, s*u#nyava#dasiddha#ntapravartakaira#ryana#ga#rjuna-

pa#dai racitam% svopajn~avr%ttisahitam% na#mna# vigrahavya#vartani#tyetad grantharatnam%

pu#jani#ya d%a#.c^ sa#taka#rimukharjikr%tena a#m%glabha#s%a#nuva#dena, sva#midva#rika#da#sa-

s*a#strin%a# vihitena ra#s%t%rabha#s%aya# ru#pa#ntaren%a ca sama#yojya praka#s*yate |

atra praka#s*iteyam% svopajn~avr%ttisahita# vigrahavya#vartani# ita: pu#rvam% deva-

na#garalipya#m% sam%skaran%atrayen%a sam%skr%ta# abhu#t |

tatra prathamam% sam%skaran%am% 1937 tame khris%t%a#bde pa#t%aliputrasthaya# viha#ra-ud%+i#sa#-

anusandha#naparis%ada# (viha#ra-ud%+i#sa#-risarca sosa#yat%i#) praka#s*itam% d%a#.c^ ka#s*i#-

prasa#da ja#yasava#la-maha#pan%d%itara#hula-sa#m%kr%tya#yana#bhya#m% ca sampa#ditamabhu#t |

dviti#yam% sam%skaran%am% 1956 tame khrista#bde navana#landa# maha#viha#rasya prathama-

s*odhapatrika#ya#m% praka#s*itam% d%a#.c^ sa#taka#ri mukharjimaha#bha#gai: sampa#ditama#gla-

bha#s%aya#'nu#ditam% ca#si#t |

tr%ti#yam% ca sam%skaran%am% darabhan*ga# (biha#ra)stha bauddha sam%skr%tagrantha#vali#

1960 tame khris%t%a#bde praka#s*itam% d%a#^ pi#^ el^ vaidya mahodayena sampa#ditamabhu#t |

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es%u tr%ti#yam% bauddhasam%skr%tagrantha#valau praka#s*itam% darabhan*ga#stham% sam%skaran%am%

pra#yas*o's*uddhibahulamata: sam%skr%tamapyasam%skr%tamiva#sti#ti na#tra#sma#kam% kimapi

sa#ha#yyam% vyadha#t | dviti#yam% maha#pan%d%itas*ri#ra#hulasa#m%skr%tya#yanasampa#ditam% sam%ska-

ran%amanya#peks%aya# s*uddham, yatha#prasan*gam% s*i#rs%akat%ippan%ya#disam%valitan~ca#sti | tr%ti#yam% sam%skaran%am% ca na#landa#praka#s*ana#khyaya# prasiddhamasti | etadeva#dhr%tya d%a#.c^ mukharji-

mahodayeneyam% vigrahavya#vartani# a#m%glabha#s%aya#'nu#dita# |

etadeva ca sam%skaran%advayama#dhr%tyedam% bauddhabha#rati#sam%skaran%am% ra#s%t%rabha#s%aya#'pi

ru#pa#ntaritam |

itthamidam% grantharatnam% bha#s%a#trayen%a sam%yojyeda#ni#masma#bhirvidus%a#m% samaks%amu-

pastha#pyate | anena s*uklakarman%a# sarve'pi bauddhadars*anamadhijigamis%avo moda-

ma#psyanti#tya#s*a#smahe |

makarasam%kra#nti:, 2050 vi^

va#ra#n%asi#

bauddhabha#rati#paris%adadhyaks%a:

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svopajn~avr%ttiyuta#ya#:

vigrahavya#varttanya#:

vis%ayakrama:

pu#rvapaks%a: 41-48

1. bha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#vata# na yukta# 41-43

(1) va#divacanasya s*u#nyatva#t 41

(2) pratijn~a#ha#ne: 42

(3) prama#n%a#siddhe: 43

2. bha#va#na#m% sasvabha#vata# yukta# 44

(1) kus*ala#didharma#n%a#m% kus*ala#disvabha#vana#bhyupagama#t 44

(2) nirvastukasya na#ma#bha#va#t 45

3. pratis%edha#siddhe: 45

(ka) dharmairvina# svabha#va#pratis%edha#t 45

(kha) sadbha#va#nabhyupagama#t 46

(ga) gra#ha#dis%at%ka#svi#ka#ra#t 46

4. pratis%edhya#siddhe: 47

siddha#ntapaks%a: 48-64

1. bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyata# yukta# (ka) 48

(1) vacanasya s*u#nyata#svi#ka#re'pi 48 

s*u#nyata#laks%an%am 48

(2) na pratijn~a#ha#ni: 49

(3) prama#n%asiddhi: 52

(4) na#pyakasma#t prama#n%asiddhi: 57

2. ito'pi bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyata# yukta# 58

(1) prati#tyasamutpannatva#t 58

(2) nirvastukasya na#ma#bha#ve'niyama#t 60

3. pratis%edhasiddhirna yukta# 61

(ka) dharmavinirmukta: svabha#va: pratis%iddha: 61

(kha) asato'pyanabhyupagamasya pratis%edha#t sama: 61

(ga) prati#tyasamutpannatva#nna nirhetukata#dos%a: 62

(gha) pratis%edha-pratis%edhya#bhyugama#dados%a: 6 

@009

##INTRODUCTORY

The term `absolutist' is to be understood in the present context

as a thinker who does not believe in the reality of the phenomenal

plurality and consequently denies that truth can be relative and

found in judgments which are ex hypothesi relative in character.

Such an absolutist may be committed to a metaphysical position

in relation to which he may seek to evaluate the truth or

otherwise of thoughts and assertions, or may maintain a

non-committal attitude in ontology. The## veda#ntist, ##for

instance, believes in the reality of the Absolute## bra#hman

##which is a spiritual entity, and is the prius and background

of the phenomenal world, although the latter is regarded as a

logically unjustifiable appearance.## na#ga#rjuna, ##the

celebrated exponent of the## ma#dhyamika ##philosophy, completely

dedicates all his energies to the proof of the unreality of the

pluralistic order envisaged by experience and thought. Whether

he believes in an ultimate reality behind the appearance is a

question on which the opinions of philosophers, exponents or

opponents, are found to differ as poles apart. Stcherbatsky and

the Japanese exponents of## na#ga#rjuna ##assert that he

believes in an ultimate reality which is positive and not an

unqualified void. Indian philosophers, particularly of the

rival schools, have however unanimously declared## na#ga#rjuna

##to be the advocate of a negative Absolute.## candraki#rti,

##the commentator of## na#ga#rjuna, ##whose original work in

Sanskrit has come down to us, does not seem to leave any

loophole to foist a positivistic interpretation upon the concept

of## s*u#nyata#. ##It must be laft an open question whether

the## s*u#nyata# ##which literally means `Voidity' is capable of

being equated with Absolute Being or Non-Being. The difficulty

of the logical appraisal

@010

of this intractable concept lies in the

consideration that all predication, either positive or negative,

must of necessity be repugnant and alien to it. For a stickler

in precision of terminology, our description of## s*u#nyata#

##as a metaphysical concept is bound to be a misnomer. Both##

na#ga#rjuna ##and the## veda#ntist ##are agreed on the point

that the ultimate truth, call it Brahman or## s*u#nyata#, ##is

only accessible to the realization of the mystic and bound to

elude conceptual thought.

We shall concern ourselves in the present discourse with the

position of the absolutist in logic and not with the

metaphysical problem. Whatever be the ontological conclusion,

the absolutist does not disguise his unqualified distrust of

the logical categories which are employed both in the subjective

and syllogistic inference by the orthodox logicians. The logical

apparatus of inference must consist of three terms, viz., the

subject or the minor term, the probans or the middle term, and

the probandum or the major term. Besides, it is the condition

sine qua non of inferential proof that there must be a major

premise which states a necessary and universal relation between

the probans and the probandum, and a minor premise showing that

the probans belongs to the subject. It is again the universal

postulate of all the schools of Indian logic that the

premises and the conclusion must be materially true. Mere formal

consistency, regardless of material truth, is not accepted as

the criterion of logical validity by any school of Indian logic.

Even## digna#ga ##and## dharmaki#rti ##who introduced radical

reforms in the logical speculations of India do not lend their

countenance to any logical argument which is not founded on

material truth. It is refreshing to observe that even##

na#ga#rjuna ##and## s*ri#harsa, ##the exponent of the##

veda#ntic ##logic, do not seek to justify their anomalous

logical position by appeal to formel consistency. Both of them

endorse that logic cannot give wide berth to the

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question of material truth of its assertions. It is also tacitly admitted

that disaffiliation from the objective reality is tantamount to

disloyalty to the cardinal canons of logic and such deviation

will reduce an argument to an abortive nonsense. Such being the

logical background, the absolutist has to observe scrupulously

the rules of the logical game in order to be able to prove his

position. The question would not have arisen, had the

abselutist refrained from entering the arena of debate. He does

not observe silence consistently with his metaphysical position,

but, on the contrary, elects to establish his position and

refute the opponent's contention by means of logically

formulated arguments. It makes no difference whether his

interest is positive or negative. How can the absolutist who

takes up the role of an absolute sceptic in logic advance any

argument, either by way of proof or refutation ? In either case

he must surrender his metaphysical commitment and thus court defeat in advance.

This is in brief the sum and substance of the logician's

arguments against the sceptic. Let us examine the reaction of

the absolutist to such an omnibus sentence of disfranchisement

pronounced against him. This situation created by the orthodox

logician against the sceptic assumed a tremendous importance and

it was imperative for the absolutists to meet the challenge in

order to establish their credentials for a philosophical

debate.

This is an iutriguing problem of philosophy which is too

apparent to require elaborate exposition. The absolutist and the

sceptic repudiate the ultimate validity of Logic and the

apparatus it employs. But logic is the only means by which one

can establish or refute a position. The sceptic claims the

prerogative of refuting all assertions of the realist without

involvement in the truth and reality of the arguments by which

he attempts to achieve

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his objective. This position will be put in a clear perspective

in the course of our exposition. We do

not know of any European thinker or thinkers who have addressed

themselves to the problem in the systematic manner in which it

has been debated in India. The problem must possess an interest

of its own and not fail to intrigue the modern mind. I therefore

propose to tackle this problem from the standpoint of the Indian

thinkers. The exposition is modern no doubt, being produced by a

modern mind. But it is based upon the original persentations of

the old philosophers of India.

The subject-matter is approached from the standpoints of the##

ma#dhyamika, ##the## yoga#ca#ra ##and the## veda#ntist ##of the

monistic school. We have also given the position of the##

naiya#yika ##realist who offers a stubborn resistance to the

absolutist's defence. We have rounded off the discourse by a

re-appraisal of the relative positions.

In the first chapter, we have expounded the standpoint of##

na#ga#rjuna ##as set forth in his work, the## vigrahavya#vartni#

##(Refutation of Opposition). In the second chapter, the

standpoint is further expounded in the light of## Candraki#rti's

##elaboration. In the third chapter, we have given the

exposition of## s*ri#harsa's ##defence of the## ma#dhyamika

##position. In the fourth chapter, this problem as approached

and tackled by the Buddhist and Vedanta scholar is set forth in

abundant detail. The## yoga#ca#ra ##position is not found in any

accreited work of the school, known to us. It is## sri#harsa

##the## veda#ntist, ##who plays the role of a defender of the##

ma#dhyamika ##and## yoga#ca#ra ##position. In## s*ri#harsa's

##time, the logical speculations assumed a formidable aspect

which is the natural outcome of vigorous thinking of several centuries.## s*ri#harsa ##came after## dhar-

maki#rti, va#caspati

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-mis*ra ##and Udayana. It is quite natural that the dialectics

of## s*ri#harsa ##exhibit astounding vigour and strength and the

evolution in thought is clearly discernible. It is hoped that

the growth of logical thought as recorded in this work will not

fail to evoke interest among the students of modern logic in

India and abroad.##

@014

s*odhanapatram

mu#lasam%skr%tapa#t%he ya: prama#do'bhu#t kvacit kvacit |

yatha#prasan*gam* sam*shodya pathni#yo budhairiha||

pr% pam* asuddh% sudh% pa#thah%

41 8 bha#vana#m* Bha#va#na#m*

50 3 vais%mikatv vais%mikatvam*

52 13 kin~cidupalabheyam* kin~cidupalabheyam*

52 24 Stes%a#na#m* stes%a#m*

54 22 hyatpadayma#na hyutpadyama#n

59 15 sasvabha#va# sasvabha#va#h%

61 9 atha hi na hi

svopajn~avr%ttisam%hita#

vigrahavya#vartani#

[bha#s%a#trayen%a sampanna#]

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##CHAPTER 1

THE## ma#dhyamika's ##LOGICAL POSITION IN THE##

vigrahavivartani#

##From the available liteature it is found the## na#ga#rjuna

##the paragon of the sceptic schools, took up the challenge with

his characteristic boldness and courage of conviction and tried

to vindicate the title of the sceptic to participate in a

logical debate. In defence, he seeks to disprove the allegation

of the logician that the use of the logical apparatus untails

self-contradiction or inconsistency on the part of the sceptic.

Fortunately, the monograph## vigrahavya#vartani# ##(Refutal of

Opposition), written by## na#ga#rjuna, ##which records a regular

duel between the two schools, has been discovered by##

ma#hapandita ra#hula sa#nkrtya#yana ##and the text has been

edited by him, {1. ##JBORS, XXXIV.II.##} and recently also by E.

H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst. {2. Melanges chinoiset

boudhiques, Neuvieme volume : 1948-1951, p. 99-152.} The text in

the latter edition is fairly correct and dependable. We have

also consulted the Tibetan version {3. Edited and translated

by G. Tucci in GOS, XLIX.} where ever doubts were felt. The

methodology of debate in the## vigrahavya#vartani# ##is in the

line of the time-honoured tradition in which the opponent's

position is stated in full in the beginning and the answer to

the objections is stated seriatim in the order followed by the

opponent. We do not propose to give a literal translation of the

text, but our paper will faithfully represent the arguments in a

language and manner intelligible to the modern mind. Nothing

possessed of logical value will be left out in our exposition.

But we must avoid the repetitions which, though they might be

useful in the past, are now calculated only to lead to inflation

of the discourse, if not boredom.

THE LOGICIANS OBJECTINS

VERSE I. The fundamental objection of the logician is that the##

s*u#nya#tavadin ##maintains that no entity whatsoever can be believed

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to possess intrinsic reality## (svabha#va, ##literally

`self-being'). By intrinsic reality', the absolutist of the

school of## na#ga#rjuna, ##seeks to understand `the reality

which a thing is supposed to possess in its own right and on its

own account'. Reality must be integral and self-contained,

neither borrowed nor derived from anything external. If a thing

is to be real, it must be shown that this reality is a necessary

part and parcel of it, and as such can never lapse or be

abrogated under any change of condition. This is also the

position of## san*kara#ca#rya ##who defines that a real is that

which has a uniform and unvariant mode of existence

{1. ekaru#pen%a ##by avastlnto yo'rthah sa## parama#rthah-##SBh on BS

II.I.II.} It is a cardinal tenet of Buddhist philosophy that

there is no real which is exempted from the law of causality

which is universal and relentless in its operation, Such being

the case, everything is subject to chang and cannot ex hypothesi

stand as an isolated entity, apart and aloof from its

predecessors and successors.## na#ga#rjuna ##does not believe in

an uncaused phenomenon and the Law of Causality is made by him

the foundation of his philosophy of## su#nyata#. ##Anything that

is subject to the operation of the Causal Law and as such

externally determined by an alien entity cannot be supposed to

have reality in its own right. The apparent reality or

existence {2. We follow Mc Taggart and refuse to draw a line of

demareation between existrence and reality.} of the phenomenon

is, from the very nature of the case, either borrowed or derived

and as such cannot be anything but appearance.

The truth of this philosophy that nothing exists in its own

right and as such cannot be real does not lie on the surface and

can only be establishad by a prolonged course of ratiocination.

As a matter of historical fact,## na#ga#rjuna ##advances an

unending series of arguments to drive home this philosophical

truth. Is## na#ga#rjuna ##consistent in this logical enterprise ?

Apart from the question of self-consistency, can he hope to be

successful in achieving his aim ? The logician avers that##

na#ga#rjuna ##essays an empossible feat. If all things are

considered to lack in intrinsic reality, how can## na#ga#rjuna,

##or for that matter any exponent of absolutism, disprove the

realty of anything ? He can achieve this by means of an argument

@003

which in the ultimate analysis is found to consist of

articulated words. And these words cannot lay claim to

self-existence. Words are also products and, like all products,

cannot be existent, either severally or collectively, in the

causal condition. The sprout is supposed to be generated by the

seed and the accessory conditions, such as soil, water, air,

season and the like. The sprout cannot be supposed to be

existent in the causal conditions severally or jointly and must

therefore be set down as destitute of self-being## (s*vabha#va).

##But the words of the propositions which are uttered to prove

the intrinsic unreality of the sprout and the like are also in

the same position. They cannot be supposed to be existent in the

physical elements or the organs of articulation or the physical

effort, which are supposed to be responsible for their

emergence. By any amount of permutation and combination of the

causes and conditions, they cannot be supposed to derive their

being from the former. Nor again can the words be considered

independent of the stream of causal conditions. Being products,

they must be considered destitute of intrinsic reality and as

such void## (i# u#nya). ##A thing which is void is unreal and an

unreal appearance cannot have any causal power. Certainly an

unreal fire cannot burn, nor can an unreal weapon cut. The words

of the sceptic, being equally unreal. cannot be supposed to

establish the conclusion that all entities are intrinsically

unreal. Things obviously are felt to be real and this reality is

sought to be negated by the absolutist. But this negation cannot

be successfully achieved by an instrument which is obviously

unreal. So the Fundamental position of the absolutist that the

reality of all entities stands refuted is incapable of being

proved.

VERSE II. Let it be supposed that the absolutist realizes the

Flaw in his argument, and sees reason to admit that his argument

in the shape of verbal propositions is real and self-existent

and as such capable of successfully contradincting the reality

of all existents. This will amount to self-surrender on his

part. He must recant his former assertion that all entities are

devoid of in trinsic reality. The words of the sceptic are

included in the subject of the proposition as they are also

entities. It will not only be a case of self-surrender but also a

case of self-contradiction. The categorical

@004

assertion."All entities are unreal" cannot be true if words are

ragarded as real.

The admission of reality or unreality of the logical ground

would culminate in the following sixfold dialectic## (s%atakotiko vadah).

(i) If all things are unreal, your argument would also be

unreal being included in the class of entities. An unreal

argument cannot rebut the obvious reality of things of

experience. It would follow then that the thesis that all things

are unreal would not be established.

(ii) If on the other hand, the thesis is supposed to be

logically established, that will eo ipso entail the unreality of

your argument. And the unreal argument would fail to rebut the

reality of things observed.

(iii) If, again, the argument be real and thus supposed to be

capable of establishing the unreality of all things (the thesis

of the absolutist), it (the argument) will fall outside the

genus of existants and there will be no instence to justify such

a hypothesis, because every possible instance will be one entity

or another. A real that is not existent is not found anywhere.

And the argument supposed to be real, will be such a

hypothetical fact which has no parallel.

(iv) If, however, the argument be supposed to fall within the

genus of existents, then it would also transpire to be unreal.

And an unreal argument would not have any logical efficiency.

(v) If, again, the orgument be unreal and yet capable of

rebutting the reality of all things, then all unreal things

would also have causal efficiency, just as the unreal argument

is considered to have. Certainly this is not a position which

can be endorsed by any rational thinker.

(vi) Suppose again that all existents are unreal and as such

incapable of causal efficiency. This will enable the absolutist

to evade the charge of the preposterous hypothesis of an unreal

having causal efficiency, no doubt. But this will be suicidal, as

the argument employed will also be unreal and as such fail to

prove the thesis.

@005

To sum up : It is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is

unreal and at the same time is capable of producing an effect.

So the absolutist is put between the horns of a dilemma : either

he must repudiate his fundamental position that all existents are

unreal or he must admit his incapability of establishing any

conclusion, positive or negetive.

This is not the only charge to which the absolutist exposes

him-self by his conduct. He is found to make an uncritical

discrimination between his argument on the one hand and all other

entities on the other, although no difference can be found. It

will be a case of uncritical distinction without difference. He

must state the ground of his discrimination [Visesa-hetu]. But

he does not and cannot offer any explanation for making fish of

one and flesh of the other. This is admitedly a grave

dereliction of duty on the part of a serious and conscientious

philosopher.

VERSE III. The sceptic may offer an analogical argument. Suppose

that the boys in a school are making a tremendous noise and this

disturbs the normal course of instruction in other classes. The

teacher comes and pronounces the command "Do not make noise" It

is by making a sound that the teacher conveys his command and

this sound prevents the emeregence of further sounds. A sound

counteracting a sound is the analogue of the negation of the

reality of all entities by an unreal argument. So there is no

inconsistency or inherent contradiction in the action of the

sceptic.

But this is only a specious analogy. The parallelism does not

hold good. The command of prohibition is conveyed by a real

sound and this real sound prevents the future occurrence of

(real) sound. But the language of the sceptic's argument is not

real. The (negative) argument is unreal and its content-the

reality of all things-is also unreal. So the analogy is not

relevent and as such cannot be adduced by the sceptic in his

support.

VERSE IV. The sceptic may the countercharge: "If may negation of

reality of things be logically absurd, your repudiation of this

position will be equally absurd. Certainly nobody cares to

refute an absurdity. My position is that all things are devoid

of reality. You aver that this is an impossible position, If your

contention

@006

were correct, there would be no necessity for the proof of an

impossibility, which is a case of flagrant self-contradiction".

The logician replies: "This defence will cut no ice with any

conscientious philosopher. The absurdity alleged against me does

not arise at all. If I made the assertion "All things are

unreal'. I would be guilty of absurdity. But that is not my

assertion but yours. So the charge of absurdity ought to go home

to you. I have only discharged the legitimate duty of an

advocate of truth by exposing the fallacy in your argument. So

that defence acts as a boomerange against you."

VERSE V. Furthermore, if the sceptic appeals to the evidence of

the recognized organs of cognition in support of his fundamental

contention, that will be perfectly unavailing. How does he know

that things exist at all ? He cannot say that by means of perception,

since perception is an entitative fact## (bha#va) ##and as such

must be condemned to be unreal. Not only this. The percipient

also will be unreal. Thus there will be no reason to suppose that

things are perceived by a percipient and, such being the case, the

sceptic cannot assert that he sees things regarding which he makes

the assertion. When things are not percived at all one cannot

make any assertion regarding them and certainly it is absurd to

suppose that a man can deny anything of which he has no know- ledge at all.

VERSE VI. Nor can be contended that inference or verbal testi-

mony or analogy will enable him to take cognizance of things.

They also stand in the same predicament as perception. And if per-

ception be impossible, far more are inference and the like which

are dependent upon preception for their genesis. Consequently

things which are sought to be proved by inference and testimony

and analogy will also be unreal, being included within the subject

of the thesis `All entities are unreal'. Further, the epistemic subject

who is supposed to take cognizance of the contents of the differ-

ent cognitive organs must also be accounted as unreal, being an

entity. The result will be that there will be no cognition of any

entity whatsoever and as a consequence reality or unreality cannot

be predicated of things which are not known at all. So the central

thesis remains unproved.

@007

VERSE VII. Furthermore, the Buddhist scripture and the teachers

who are well versed in the different branches of it propound a list

of 119## kus*ala-dharmas ##(moral excellences which are calculated to

promote the spiritual progress of the aspirant). {1. A detailed treatment and expoeition of morally good and bad mentations has been by E.H. Johnsion in IHQ. XIV. 314-333.} These mental

phenomena are asserted to possess the character of goodness.

Such is also the case with immoral mentations which degrade a

person in the moral plane. None but a non-believer can impugn

the reality and moral value of these mental states. But if the

thesis of the sceptic were true, it would end in the repudiation

of these virtues and vices, and thereby the validity of the scriptural

ipse dixit. Certainly this cannot be acceptable to any seeker of

truth.

VERSE VIII. Besides, the spiritual forces which progressively

lead to the attainment of## nirva#n%a, ##and also those which lead to

enlightenment, and those which are the constituent factors of it,

and their opposites have been categorically propounded in the

scriptures as real fact. The assertion of the sceptic that all

existents are unreal appearance will give the lie direct to these

categorical propositions of authoritative scripture-a contingency

which cannot be acquiesced in by a lover of truth and aspirant for

spiritual perfection.

VERSE IX. Again, if all entities are devoid of reality and thus

have no individuality, they would not be capable of being design-

ated by names. But each entity has got a distinct name and desig-

nation, and each designation has got a meaning which must be a

real fact. The omnibus denial of the sceptic would reduce them to

nonsense, which is flatly contradicted by our experience.

VERSE X. If the sceptic feels compelled to qualify his thesis out

of deference to the realization of the significance of words and

names, and concedes the possibility of self-existence as such##

(svabha#va) ##and still elects to deny it of the entities known, he

must enunciate the thing or things which are credited which self-

existence. Well, the latter must be distinct from the entities

known, But the sceptic does not care to propound any such

entity. It stands to reason to conclude that the hypothesis of a

@008

self-existent entity outside the category of existents known must

be declared to be a nullity or a hoax.

VERSE XI. Furthermore, negation has relevancy only with

regard to an existent fact. The proposition, for instance, `There

is no jar in the room' implies the non-existence of a real jar.

There can be no negation of an unreal fiction. Only a real can

admit of logical negation. So the unqualified negation of all enti-

ties and their individual reality involvs self-contradiction. Nega-

tion, as has been observed, presupposes real existence. The real

denial of the reality of things experienced or known would conse-

quently involve their reality and this will be nothing short of un-

abashed self-contradiction.

The idea of the realist is that since a significant negation nece-

ssarily presupposes the reality of the negatum, absolute and unive-

rsal negation is necessarily vitiated by self-contradiction. If the

negation be unreal the reality of things negated remains unaffected.

If again this nagation be real that will contradict the central

thesis "All things are unreal" in as much as the negation itself

would be an exception. Furthemore, since denial presupposes the

reality of the thing denied the reality of all things is eo ipso admitted.

So the sceptic is confinted with the dilemma whether he

admits or denies the reality of denial. The reality of unreality of

denial thus fails to impair the reality of things.

This position has been improved in the## nya#yakusuma#n~jali. {1.III.2.} The

crux of the problem broached by the realist centres round the fact

whether conceptual reality or empirical reality is necesserily

conterminous with metaphysical reality or not. The realist advocates

the former position, where as the sceptic or transcendentalist keeps

by two orders of reality separate.

VERSE XII. If there be no reality anywhere in anything. what is

then the meaning of the negative proposition. `All entities are divoid

of reality' ? Certainly a fiction cannot be an object of negation.

The non-existence of a fiction is evident on the face of it and the

statement of it is uncalled for. For instance, nobody feels called

@009

upon to negate coldness in fire, or hotness in water. Why ?

Because these attributes are non-existent. If there were no reality in

existents, the denial of it would be not only irrelevant but

positively repugnant to the nature of things.

VERSE XIII. The sceptic may contend that the denial of reality of

things known by us is neither irrelevant nor incompatible. The

position may be made clear by a concrete illustration. A gullible

fool is deluded into the belife that he sees a lake of water in the

desert. It will be a notorious illusion as the mirage will be mis-

taken for water. In such a case, a wise man sees the plight of the

dupe and hastens to correct him by asserting the belief in water to

be entirely false. It is not denied that there is a persistent belief

on the part of unenlightened people in the reality of things per-

fceived by them. But the enlightened philosopher, out of mercy,

declares `All these things are devoid of reality', in order to cambat

the prevalent illusion. The belief in the reality of things, though

almost universal, is a downright error in spite of its persistence.

VERSE XIV. This is apparently a plausible argument. But even

if that be so the sceptic cannot deny that there is (i) the belief,

(ii) the object of belief, and also (iii) the person who believes.

Again (iv) the denial of the false illusion is a fact and (v) the

object (viz., the illusion) is also a fact, and (vi) the factuality of

the person who denies it is also not capable of repudiation. This

very illustration of common error and its correction demonstrate

the reality of the sixfold entity. And this gives the lie direct to the

sceptic's assertion `All entities are devoid of essence'.

VERSES XV & XVI. if, to escape this predicament, the sceptic

chooses to assert that there is neither the false belief, nor any

object of such belief, nor again any believer, then there would be

no possibility of negation of such a belief, and as such no object

of negation, and far less the person who negates. Then the nega-

tion of the reality of all existents would transpire to be a fiction,

and with it the object of negation and the person making the

negation should be set aside as impossible facts. The logical

impossibility of negation as such would leave the reality of things

absolutely unaffected.

@010

VERSES XVII & XVIII. Moreover, the universal denial of reality

perforce entails the unreality of the condition of proof (hetu, the

logical ground). If the logical ground by means of which any

conclusion can be proved be itself unreal, the conclusion will not

follow. So how can there be a logical possibility for the establish-

ment of the proposition `All entities are unreal' ? The failure of

proof would on the other hand imply the truth of the opposite, viz.,

the reality of all things. The sceptic may seek to escape the plight

and assert that things are proved without the help of a logical

ground and so the denial of reality will be eo ipso established. But

the same line of argument is open to the realist also. He can also

claim with equal justice of privilege that the reality of things is

proved by itself without reference to any logical ground.

VERSE XIX. The affirmation of the reality of the logical ground

would give the lie direct to the sceptic's thesis of universal

unreality. Moreover, so for as the verdict of experience is concerned,

it does not lend the remotest support to the existence of an unreal

entity.

VERSE XX. Finally, the absurdity of the absolutist's negation of

reality in all entities can be brought into relief if we examine the

relative status of negation and negatum. If negation be an antece-

dent event and the negatum be a subsequent phenomenon, the

negation will be impossible. If, on the other hand, the negatum

be an antecedent event and negation a posterior phenomenon,

that also will not help the absolutist out of his difficulty. If the

negatum be a fait accompli safely entrenched in its place, a subse-

quent negation will not affect its reality in the least degree. The

previous existence as a historical fact cannot be rendered null and

void. To suppose that they are synchronous will only make the

confusion worse confounded. Two coexistents cannot stand in

the relation of cause and effect. If negation and negatum be

coexistent, neither negation will be the condition of the negatum,

nor negatum will be the condition of negation, exactly like the

two horns of an animal, which are coexistent, being synchronous

in origin, but neither the right horn is the condition of the left, nor

the left of the right. This shows that the reality of things does not

@011

admit of negation, and hence the thesis of the absolutist is a

dogmatic assertion. {1. The argument of the realist seems to presuppose that negation

and negatum stand in the relation of cause and effect and

vice versa. It is contended that the unreality of things, advo-

cated by the absolutist, would subvert the causal relationship

which is put forward as an undisputed truth. It seems difficult

to follow how negation and negatum can be related

as cause and effect. We offer a tentative explanation of the

apparent puzzle. Negation and negatum are relative concepts

and as such one cannot be understood without reference to the

other. Each is a presupposition of the other. Such being the

case, each serves as the determinant of the other. A deter-

minant is however a species of cause. The causal relationship

is easily understandable in so far as the understanding of the

one requires that of the other. But as understanding is the

key to the objective nature of things, the causal relationship

need not be merely subjective. Besides, the status of a things

as a negatum and that of another as the negation cannot be a

subjective superimposition. They must be objective. Other-

wise the real character of a thing cannot be amenable to human

cognition. If it be conceded that cognition introducer a deffe-

rence in the character of the real, it will be impossible to

distinguish what attribute belongs to the thing in itself and

what is superimposed upon it by the human intellect. It is

for this reason the## vais*esika ##believes that numbers from 2 to n,

though engendered by an intellectual act of synthesis, are

vested as objective attributes in the reals.}

The Absolutist's Reply

VERSE XXI. The contention of the realist was that he words of he

absolufist's argument would be devoid of reality and as such,

would not succeed in repudiating the reality of all entities. The

absolutist admits the truth of the premise of the realist's argument.

He affirms "Your contention is that my words have no reality in

the causal conditions and there is no existent outside the sphere

of causal operation, and so my words can lay no pretension to

reality." We admit the truth of it. I do not claim that the words are

@012

real. Certainly they are as unreal as all other things, being subject

to the law of causal operation. So your animadversion that my

argument will fail to annul the reality of things falls as a damp

squib.

VERSE XXII. The law of Dependent Origination## (prati#tyabha#va)

is equivalent to and proof of the intrinsic unreality## (s*u#nyata#)

##of things. A thing which is found to come into existence in dependence

upon an antecedent fact must forfeit its claim to intrinsic

reality. The realist has failed to understand the logical import of##

s*u#nyata# ##and his animadversion proceeds from this basic misunder-

standing. Now,## s*u#nyata# ##is nothing else than the fact of this

Dependent Origination. Whatever thing is found to derive its

existence from an antecedent and thus depends upon the latter

for its existence cannot claim intrinsic reality of its own. If

things were real in their own right and by their intrinsic nature

they could come into being independently of the antecedent

causes and conditions. But, as a matter of fact, they are tagged

on to the preceding events and as such cannot be conceived to

have an intrinsic existence which a real, by the very definition of

it, must be believed to possess. As regards my arguments which

are nothing but a series of words, they are events in time and as

such dependent upon antecedent conditions. They have no in-

trinsic reality. So yours is a case of wasted labour, so far as you

seck to prove the unreality of my words.

The next charge that an unreal thing can have no causal

efficiency is absolutely inconsequential. Causal efficiency is

rather the criterion of things which have no intrinsic reality of

their own. In these matters, we have to be guided by the testi-

mony of experience and not a priori reasoning. Consider, for

instance, the behaviour of such things as a chariot, a textile, a jar

and so on and so forth. They are certainly produced by causes

and conditions and yet are found to exercise their causal power

in respect of their relevant effects. For instance, the chariot, as a

conveyance, is used as carrier of men and things. The jar is

used as a container of honey or water or milk. A textile serves

to protect the wearer from heat and cold and the onslaught of

winds. Certainly, being products, they cannot have intrinsic

@013

##reality of their own and are yet found to be productive of definite-

effects. Such is also the case with my argument. It is also-

devoid of intrinsic reality, being the product of a set of definite-

causes of conditions. It produces a result in that it communicates,

a meaning. So the whole argument of the realist is based upon

a misconception that causal efficieony presupposes intrinsic-

reality. The ground of the charge is rather a pointer to the oppo-

site, truth, viz, that only things which have no intrinsic reality and

rigid constitution can act as causes and be the effects of their own

causes.

VERSE XXIII##. na#ga#rjuna ##now proposes to clinch his conclusion-

by means of examples which. though they may not be acceptable

to the modern mind, were believed to be possible facts in his days.

Well, the negation of reality by an unreal argument is not actu-

fally impossible. It is notorious that phantom men and women are

created by magicians and thaumaturgists and they behave exactly

like real men and women. The cinematography in modern times

also succeeds in creating verisimilitude by devices which are not

far remote from the magician's tricks. A phantom man prohibits

another phantom man from a certain course of conduct. Both the persons-the one who prohibits and the one who is prohibited-

are equally unreal. But the factuality of the prohibition and its

suceess are exemplified by the behaviour of such phantom persons.

Such is exactly the case with my argument which, though unreal,

succeeds in rubutting the prevalent belief in the reality of things.

So your accusation that an unreal argument cannot successfully

remove a superstitious belief has no cogency. And as regards the

sixfold dialectic propounded by you; its hollowness stands exposed

by this very argument. It is never the proposition of the absolutist

that his argument is not included within the purview of all entities.

Nor is it contended that it is not unreal, much less that all things

are not unreal.

VERSE XXIV. Well, the argument is not believed to be real por se.

So it does not involve surrender of my fundamental position. And

so the charge of uncritical discrimination cannot hold good. There-

fore, there is no occasion for the statement of a special ground of distinction.

@014

The fact of the matter is: My argument, being the product of a

chain of causes and conditions, cannot be considered to come into

existence by virtue of its own independent nature. It has been obse-

rved before that what has not self-existence is unreal. My argument

also is equally unreal just like the rest of phenomena. So there is

no case of uncritical and irrational discrimination. If we mainta-

ined that the argument was intrinsically real, we would expose

ourselves to the charge of discriminatory treatment. But this is

just the reverse of our position. And therefor all the conseque-

ntial charges are only the creatures of the imagination of the

opponent.

VERSE XXV. The analogy of the command by words prohibi-

ting the creation of noise (that is, of words) is entirely irrelevant

and is not employed by us for the purpose. In the example,

words serve to prevent the occurrence of other words. But we

do not assert that things have any intrinsic nature of their own,

or that they have any claim to reality. Were it the case that an

unreal argument was employed to rebut the unreality of things,

the example could be relevant. But our position is just the oppo-

site of it. The argument is used to preve the unreality of things

and not to negate it. So the consequence thrust upon us that

the negation of unreality would entail the reality of things is only

a perversion of our intention. We emphatically affirm the unrea- lity of things and so the example bears no analogy to our

position.

VERSE XXVI. It has been shown that the example would have

been relevant had an unreal argument been employed to rebut the

unreality of things. The example illustrates the use of a real

word for the prevention of a real word. The negator and the

negatum are of co-ordinate status. The argument, though unreal,

is adduced to rebut the reality of things. If an unreal argument

were advanced to rebut the unreality of things, things would have

to be accepted as possessed of intrinsic reality. But this would

run counter to our Fundamental position, since we maintain with

uniform consistency the intrinsic unreality of things and never

subscribe to their reality.

VERSE XXVII. The truth of our doctrine can be elucidated by

the following example. The## tatha#gata ##or a disciple of him created

@015

a phantom woman in order to annihilate the lingering weakness

of a person for the opposite sex. The unregenerated man was

deluded into mistaking this phantom woman for a real woman

and developed affection for her. In order to purify him of such

evil propensities, a phantom man is created. The phantom man

is made to behave by a fiat of his will as a wise saint and to

enlighten the deluded soul by his instruction. The dupe of the

illusion is made to realize the hollowness of his love and thus, by

a process of spiritual catharsis, is freed from the sway of lower

possions. Though the woman in question is a false appearance

and so also the saint, yet the weak aspirant is emancipated from

the shackles of lower impulses and passions. This will be the

appropriate illustration of our procedure. The argument is like

the sermon of the phantom saint and the phantom woman is the

prototype of all unreal phenomena. The unreal argument serves

to dispel the illusion of reality to which the unregenerated souls

fall easy victims. The example of the prohibitive injunction is

however devoid of any parallelism.

VERSE XXVIII. If we look closely into the argument of the

opponent, it will be found to be vitiated by a falacy. The example

of the sound of warning derives its cogency from the supposition

that it has an intrinsic reality of its own, And this is made the

logical ground. But the sound also cannot lay claim to intrinsic

reality, being the product of a chain of causes and conditions.

The assertion that the sound is real and serves to prohibit the

future occurrence of real sounds proceeds from a misconception.

The reality of sound is only of the empirical order. And we

endorse this empirical reality as a concession because of its pragmatic utility. The admission of empirical reality is only a

make-believe necessary for the creation of conviction of the

ultimate truth. It is a necessary expedient and even the enligte-

ned saint must have recourse to it in order to edify the ignorant

seeker of truth. It may be an illusion. But it has a pragmatic

value, both intellectual and moral. Though it may not have a

logical justification and from the rational standpoint there is no

raison d'etre for the worid, it cannot be denied that it is there.

The appearance may be irrational. But no amount of logical

speculation can cancel its existence. Besides, all intellectual and

@016

moral disciplines derive their as validity from this empirical reality

and they also cannot claim a superior order of reality qva empirical

facts. The appearance of a## tatha#gata ##is necessary because there

is this imperfect world. And the necessity of salvation from this

imperfect world would not be felt by any person unless the

imperfect world were an existent fact. What the## ma#dhyamika

##philosophy and so also## san*kara's veda#nta ##seek to emphasize is

that the world of plurality is not ultimate truth, though its

factuality cannot be denied so long as one is in it. The assertion

of the unreality of the world does not therefore spell any danger

to the historical, intellectual and moral orders and the disciplines

appertaining there to. These orders have only a provisional validity

and as much reality as is felt to be necessary by the realist.

VERSE XXIX. The realist has defended his repudiation of

the denial of reality by the plen that it is occasioned by abso-

lutist's assertion of his thesis and so the charge of self-contra-

diction and inconsistency lies at his door. "But this is nothing but

a perversion of my standpoint", says the absolutist. "If there were

any thesis propounded by me, then the charge of self-contradi-

ction could be brought home against me, But as a matter of fact

I cannot be supposed to make any real assertion when all things

are known to be unreal, being destitute of self-existence and

autonomy, which are the criteria of ultimate truth. So you cannot

charge me with he assertion of any thesis in which you can pick

holes. The whole impeachment proceeds either from an intellectual

incapacity or a deliberate dishonesty."

VERSE XXX. The realist repriMands the absolutist that he con-

troverts the things which he cognizes by means of recognized cognitive organs and also unabashedly repudiates these very

organs. This is nothing but a case of shameless self-contradiction

or a deception.

But this charge is equally unfounded. The absolutist observes in reply-"If I made any pretension to apprehend anything by

means of cognitive organs or cared to establish any position or

repudiate any contention by appeal to the testimony of these

cognitive organs, then I would lay myself open to these charges.

But as a matter of truth I do not make any such pretension and so

@017

the charge is wide of the mark. At any rate it leaves me perfectly

unconcerned."

VERSE XXXI. "Furthermore. I may be permitted to pose a

question to the realist in order to clarify the issue. If you, realist,

really believe that all the things that are cognized are proved by

means of well recognized cognitive organs such as perception,

inference, analogy and testimony. I would like to be enlightened

by you as to how you come to believe in the validity of these very

cognitive organs. What is the warrant of their validity ? What are

their credentials ? If you cannot adduce any warrant in support of

your belief and, on the contrary, feel no compunction to declare

that they do not require any proof for their validity you will have

to recant your thesis that all things are proved by valid cognitive

organs".

VERSE XXXII. If, on the other hand, the validity of the cogni-

tive organs be supposed to be established by other such organs,

then it will give rise to a vicious infinite series.

The cognitive organs are supposed to prove the existence of

the things cognized by them and if the organs themselves are

open to doubt, they will not succeed in the task credited to them.

The appeal to other organs will necessitate the postulation of a series of such organs which will have no limit.

Well, what is the reason of such a series being condemned

as a logical flaw ? The answer is "If the chain of the cognitive

organs as vehicles of proof be extended without limit in the

infinite past, there would be no primary cognitive organ whose

validity can be considered to be established. There being no

primal cognitive organ secure in its validity, the succeeding

organs, which are supposed to derive their validity from their

predecessors, will themselves be assailed by authentic doubt.

The consequence will be that no selection can be made, from this

infinite chain, of any one, either in the beginning or in the middle

or in the end, as being securely established in its validity. In the

absence of an initial limit, there will be no end and consequently

no middle because these concepts are relative; and the collapse of

the first term will entail that of the succeeding links."

@018

VERSE XXXIII. If the cognitive organs## qua# ##proof are accepted

to be valid without recourse to the verdict of other such organs,

that will involve the surrender of your fundamental position. More-

over, the propounder of such a thesis will expose himself to the charge of making an unauthorized discrimination. Or, in the alter-

native, he will be compelled to adduce a reason for this differen-

tial treatment.

The fundamental position of the realist is that the reality of

things is attested by a cognitive organ bearing upon it. Now the

question is legitimately posed "If a cognitive organ validates the

reality of anything known by it, what is the source of the validity

of the organ itself ?" Suppose that no such validating ground can

be adduced and, on the contrary, that it is dogmatically asserted

that so far as the cognitive organs are concerned, their validity

does not require any further proof. Well, this dogmatic assertion

will amount to a confession that there may be things which are

accepted to be valid without any (organ of) proof. This will

invalidate the fundamental standpoint of the realist that all things

are proved by some cognitive organ. The organs of proof are

also things, and if they are established without the attestation of

another cognitive organ, the universal proposition will have to

be amended. The realist will be under an obligation to make a

reaservation for the cognitive organs themsalves. And the

differential treatment involved in this reservation has to be justified.

But no logical ground has been and can be adduced in support.

The realist may strike a pose of injured innocence. Well, so

far as the cognitive organs are concerned, they stand in a different

position by their vary nature. They prove things and prove

themselves. This is not a newfangled theory, but has the support

of ancient tradition. Here we quote an ipse dixit of the school.

"Just as fire illumines other things as well as its own self, so

the cognitive organs prove the existence of things as well as their own".

VERSE XXXIV. But the example is entirely irrelevant and has

no parallelism with the present case. It is not the case that fire

illumines its own being. Certainly nobody can claim that fire

remained unperceived and unillumined like a jar in darkness. The

@019

fact of the matter is that the realist suffers from a misconception.

It is not a fact that fire is self-illumining. The analogy of fire

is entirely out of the question. It is on this analogy that the

doctrine of self-validation is propounded by the realist. There

might be a presumption of the possibility if the self-illumination

of fire were a fact. But it is not. All cases of illumination are

simply preceded by an unillumined state. For example, the jar was covered by darkness and as such remained unperceived. It

comes to be subsequently perceived when email illumined by fire.

If the fire were previously unillumined and rinedned unperceived

in darkness and then subsequently became illumined, it could be

held to be illumined by itself. But this is not the case. No body

can adduce any evidence to establish a previous unillumined

condition of fire. So the example is only an instance of misco-

nception and utter irrelevance.

VERSE XXXV. Furthermore, if on the basis of an ipse dixit, fire

is supposed to illumine itself just in the same manner as it illumines

an external object, it should also burn itself as it is seen to burn

other things.

This is the idea of## na#ga#rjuna. ##A thing cannot bring its causal

power to bear upon its own self,though it can do so in respect

of an alien object. The subject-object relation involved in the

transitive verbs presupposes numerical difference. The subject

can never be the object of the same act. Were it not so, fire

could burn its own self as it burns others. So the conclusion

that a cognitive organ is self-proved does not follow, as the premise of the self-regarding activity of fire is itself a false

assumption.

VERSE XXXVI. If fire be supposed to be capable of bringing its act of illumination to bear upon its own self, it could also be

supposed with equal plausibility that darkness will also cover its

own self. An analogical argument is notorious for its weakness

and has very little cogency even when it is true. But it fails as a

broken reed where it is based upon a fundamental misunderstand-

ing of the nature of a thing. The present is an instance of it.

VERSE XXXVII. Furthermore, there is no darkness either in the

being of fire or in its locus. So how can there be an illumination

@020

in respect of fire as its object ? Illumination is nothing but the dest-

ruction of darkness.

The idea is this. Illumination has no meaning except with refe-

rence to a previous state of darkness. Darkness is a positive entity

according to the Buddhist, the Jaina, the## mima#msist ##and the## veda#ntist.

##Why should a thing remain unillumined and become illumined

when light is brought to bear upon it ? What is the modus operandi

of light in the act of illumination ? Certainly. It is nothing but

this that the absence of light is concomitant with the presence of

darkness whose function is to envelop a thing and make it una-

menable to perception. The light makes the object fit to be

perceived by removing the obscurity imposed by darkness. If

fire chose to illumine its own self, it would have to be conceded

that it also destroyed the darkness which impeded its illumination.

But this cannot be proved. So this theory of self-illumination has

no foundation in truth.

The realist may put up a defence. Well, the absolutist's argu-

ment is calculated to confirm the realist's thesis. It is true that

there is no darkness in fire, nor in the place where fire exists.

This very fact ought to be construed as proof of the thesis that fire

illumines its own self as well as an other. Fire annihilates dark

ness as soon as it is born. The birth of fire and the aninhilation of

darkness are synchronous events. It stands to reason therefore

that there cannot be darkness either in the body of fire or in the

locus where it exists. This is due to the fact that fire illumines

itself and all other things within its range at the very time when

it comes into existence.

In reply to this it may be observed:

VERSE XXXVIII. The argument that fire illumines as soon as it is

born is preposterous. Certainly, fire does not come into contact

with darkness at the moment of its origination.

The position that fire illumines itself and others as soon as it

comes into being is an unfounded assuption. To be sure, it can-

not be supposed that fire makes an impact upon darkness even at

the time of its birth. This assumption will, on the contrary, nece-

ssitate the admission of the coexistence of fire and darkness at

@021

least for one moment. But this will be an absurdity which even

the realist demurs to endorse. In the absence of synchronism

there can be no impingement upon darkness and so there can be

no occasion for annihilation of darkness by fire. It follows that

no illumination will be possible, because it is nothing but annihilation of darkness.

VERSE XXXIX. Further, if we admitted that fire can make away

with darkness without coming in to contact with the latter, you

would be compelled to admit as a consequence that fire existing

in a corner of this room could also destroy all the darkness that

exists in all the worlds.

This is only an elaboration of the previeus argument. The

argument is a reductio ad abrsur dum. The idea is that the relation of

destructive opposition in which fire and darkness are supposed to

stand to each other must necessitate the congruence of the two at

least for a moment. But this admission will prove that they are

not absolutely incongruent.## na#ga#rjuna ##banks upon the fact of

absolute incongruity of fire and darkness. The fact that they

cannot coexist in the same substratum at any time shows that

there can be no contact, much less a tussle, between them. But if

there be no contact possible, the question of one superseding the other will be a petitio principii.

VERSE XL. If you, realist, assert that the organs## qua# ##cogniti-

ons are known by themselves, you will have to admit that they

will be known without reference to their relevant objects. For

self-cognition is incompatible with dependence on an alien fact.

The idea is this. Organs of cognition are believed to be of the

nature of cognition according to the Buddhist and other Indian

schemes of epistemology, excepting the later exponents of the##

nya#ya ##theory of perception and their followers here and there.

That cognitions are known by themselves is the position of##

dharmkirti,## prabha#kara ##and the Jaina logicians. This is opposed

by the## nya#ya ##School.## na#ga#rjuna ##and also## kuma#rila bhatta. ##The##

sa#n*khya ##and the## veda#nta, ##though they do not believe that cogni-

tions are self-intuited, assert that they never remain unperceived,

being revealed by the eternal light of the self with which they are

connected from the very beginning.

@022

We must distinguish the theory of self-cognition## (svapraka#s*atva)

##from the theory of self-validation## (sva#tah pra#ma#n%ya). ##We reserve

the treatment of this logical problem for a subsequent paper.## na#ga#rjuna's ##argument applies against both these theories. He

enters a strong caveat against all philosophers who advocate one

or the other theory, though not necessarily both. The gravamen

of his complaint lies in the inherent impossibility of the same thing

being the subject and the object of the same act.

As for the present argument,## na#ga#rjuna ##shows with consider-

able force of logic that the concepts of cognition and cognitum,

subject and object are relative, and one cannot be thought of

without the other. If cognition as an organ be numerically and

functionally different from the cognitum, the dependence of the

former upon the latter will deprive it of all claim to be known and

proved by itself. Dependence upon a foreign element is incomp-

atible with the self-autonomy of cognition, either as an act or as

an organ.

It may be urged: What is the harm if cognitions## qua# ##organs.

are supposed to be independent of the objects to be known by

them ? In reply to this,## na#ga#rjuna ##observes:

VERSE XLI. If cognitions are known or proved without a nece-

ssary reference to the objects, as you assert, these cognitions

will not be known as having necessary relation to any cognitum.

The idea is : If a cognition be self-contained and self-centred, it will not have any reference to any object. It will then cease to

be the cognition of a fact. But cognition which is not the cong-

nition of anything is a chimera.

If the cognitions stand in necessary relation with their objects,

you cannot maintain that cognitions are proved irrespective of

their objects. In other words, this will entail the abandonment of

your thesis of self-cognition or self-validation.

VERSE XLII. Suppose we admit that cognitions are realized

with necessary reference to their objects, what will be the harm ?

Well, this admission will involve the further admission of the

antecedent existence of the cognitions as accomplished facts.

@023

The reason is that nothing can be supposed to have reference to

and stand in need of another unless it is already found to be in

existence.

To admit that cognitions come into being having necessary reference to and thus standing in need of their relevant objects

will amount to the metaphysical fallacy of bringing into existence

of what already is in existence. This will be a case of wasted

labour of love. It is exactly on a par with the logical fallacy

called `proof of a proved fact'## (siddhasa#dhana). ##when an arguer

seeks to prove for the conviction of his opponent any fact which

the latter does not dispute,the former is accused of proving a proved fact. It is sheer waste of energy and skill. An argument

is necessary only when there is a doubt regarding any fact at

issue.##

na#ga#rjuna ##uses the expressian## siddhasa#dhana ##in such a way as

can be supposed to admit of twofold explanation. Cognitions as

organs of proof may be supposed to be proved by themselves or

by the objects to be known. The first alternative is ruled out of

court, and the second alternative is elaborately criticized by## na#ga#rjun.

##If however it be supposed that cognitions come into play

in dependence upon their objects, the former must be conceded

to have ptior existence as accomplished facts. Certainly, when a

thing is known to depend upon another, it must be conceded that

the depending thing is already existent. None but an existent can

be supposed to depend upon or stand in need of another. If this

be so, this question of dependence upon another fact, either for

coming into existence or for proof of itself, will be entirely

redundant. There is no meaning in trying to bring into existence

what is already possessed of it. or to make known what is already

known.

VERSE XLIII. Furthermore, if cognitions## qua# ##organs are supposed

to be proved by their reference to and consequent dependence

upon the objects to be known, the proof of the objects will not

be dependent upon the good offices of the organs. If cognitive organs are made to depend upon their objects

either for proof or for existence, the independent existence of the

@024

objects would be presupposed by the act. In that case, the proof

of objects will be independent of the services of the cognitive

organs. But this is plainly absurd. Certainly, the objects to be

proved cannot be supposed to furnish proof of the organs which

are requisitioned for the proof of the former.

VERSE XLIV. If the objects to be known or proved are supposed

to be known or proved independently of the good offices of

the cognitive organs, the search for the latter will be entirely

uncalled for. The cognitive organs are requisitioned for the proof

of the objects. And if the objects themselves are already known

and thus stand independent of any proof, the postulation of the

different organs and their application will be absolutely abortive.

VERSE XLV. If again, it be supposed by you that the cognitive

organs are brought into existence and made effectual by the

service of the things to be cognized, that will only lead to the

entire subversion of the relation of the organs and the cognizables.

If the cognitive organs are supposed to depend upon the cognizables

in order to come into existence and function, the charge of

inconsequence will be ruled out, no doubt. But it will give rise to a grave disaster in the logical field. The status of organs and

cognizables will suffer reversal. The organs will be reduced to

the status of cognizables and the cognizables will be raised to the

status of organs, because the nature of their services will be

entirely revolutionized. The cognizable would have to be reckoned

as organ, since it would serve as the instrument of the proof of

the recognized organ and the latter would be degraded to the

status of the former, because its very existence and functional

success would be dependent upon the good offices of the

cognizable. This reversal involved in the interchange of position

or function is bound to give shock to the logical conscience of all

believers in the logical tradition.

VERSE XLVI. Let it be supposed that the proof of the cognizable

is the consequence of the proof of the organ,because the

former depends on the latter. Be it supposed again that the

proof of the organ depends upon that of the cognizable. In

that case neither of the two will be susceptible of proof. Th

@025

##VERSE XLVII. The cognizables will be proved by the organs

and those very organs will be proved by those very cognizables.

if this be the situation, the cognizables will be responsible for the

existence of the organs, and if the former again are supposed to

be dependent upon latter for their very existence, the former will

not be capable of bringing into existence the latter.

If the proof and existence of one be supposed to depend upon

that of the other and vice tersa, neither will be independently

existent. In other words, both of them would be non-existent.

And thus none can afford to be the proof of the other. The

reciprocal dependence of both the relata thus makes both of them

non-existent figments.

VERSE XLVIII. To put it the other way about : If the organs

be supposed to be proved by the cognizables, and the latter

again are to be proved by the former, how can the cognizables,

dependent as they are for their existence and functioning upon

those very organs which are to be brought in to play by them,

be the proof of the organs ?

The fallacy of reciprocal dependence, either in respect of

genesis or in respect of cognition, lies in the failure to recognize

the antecedent existence of one the terms independently of the

service of the other. It must be recognized that the relation

is at bottom one of cause and effect whether one term is believed

to be dependent upon the other for its existence or its proof. The

condition and the result cannot be self-identical. "Thus if A

depended upon B and B in its turn depended upon A for its

genesis or subsistence, and A depended in order to be cognized

upon the cognition of B, and B again in order to be cognized

were found to depend upon the cognition of A, the result would

be a case of mutual dependence in respect of genesis, subsistence

and cognition respectively." {1. Dr. Bagchi : Inductive Reasoning, p. 157.}##

na#ga#rjuna ##seems not to be satisfied by only pointing out the

fallacy involved in a circular argument and therefore gives a

concrete example which will convince even the most obtuse

person of the absurdity involved in such tactics.

@026

VERSE XLIX. If one were to say, the son is one which is

generated by a father, and that father again is supposed to be

generated by that very son, then we challenge the assertor of such

a proposition to point out who is the son and who is the father.

Who begets whom ? The absurdity of such a proposition does not stand in need of further elaboration.

The absurdity of the proposition is writ large upon its face, and

it does not require any proof to be driven home, because it is self-

transparent. Absurdity can neither be proved nor refuted unless

the exposure of it does not constitute refutation enough.##

na#ga#rjuna ##claims that the same absurdity is involved in the

supposition that a cognizable is proved by an organ and the latter

again by the former. The upshot is that none can make out what is

the organ of proof and what the cognitum of it. It makes no difference

whether the relation between them be one of `generator

and generated' or `prover and proved' or `cognizer and cognized'.

In the first case, the causal relation will stand between the two

terms directly and in the latter two the relation will hold between

the cognitions of the same. Whether the organ is dependent

upon the cognizable for its being or the cognition of the former

upon that of the latter, and vice versa, the fallacy of mutual dependence will be equally present.

VERSE L. We ask the opponent to prove who is the father and

who is the son in the case cited above. Our doubt honestly arises

since both of them are asserted to be possessed of the characteristics

of father and son.

It is extremely difficult to make out who is the father and who

is the son in the example cited above. Both of them are possessed

of the character of fatherhood and sonship, since each one of

them is believed to be the generator and also the generated. The

generator is the father and the generated is the son. Each, being

generator, is entitled to be considered as father. And each, being

generated, is entitled to be considered as son. The doubt is quite

legitimate, but does not admit of solution, since there is no characteristic

which can distinguish the one from the other.

@027

The parallelism of the same persons being the father and the

son of each other is exactly applicable to the issue between the

organ and the cognizable. When the same thing is trotted out to

be the organ and its cognitum and vice versa, the case is exactly

parallel. The difficulty of determination of each of them either

as the organ or as the cognitum is exactly the same.

VERSE LI. The upshot is that the organs are neither proved nor

generated by themselves, nor by one another, nor by other organs,

nor again by the cognizables; nor can they be supposed to be

proved without the help of any condition.

It cannot be maintained that a perception is generated or made known by itself, that is to say, by that very perception. An inference also cannot be supposed to be conditioned or proved by

that very inference; an analogy cannot be supposed to be proved

by that very analogy; and a verbal testimony cannot be supposed

to be proved by that very verbal testimony. It is not again possible

to maintain that each is proved by inference and the rest, or

inference by perception and the rest and so on. Nor is it possible to

maintain that these organs are proved by another organ of a

different kind, simply because there is no evidence of such an

organ. And if it were possible, the same difficulty would arise

with regard to it. We have also seen that the organs cannot be

dependent upon their objects, either for existence or for proof.

The situation will not be improved if the cognizables are taken

separately or collectively and in different permutation and

combination. The last altenative that these organs of proof are

independent of any other condition in respect of their origin or function

is doomed to failure. It is inconceivble that an event can happen without any condition preceding it.

The conclusion is irresistible that the realist's thesis that there

are cognizables which are proved by their organs which are

equally existent facts is only a dogmatic and uncritical assertion.

So all the objections based upon the postulation of the organs of

proof or their cognizables are found on scrutiny to be the unreal

figments of the realist's imagination.

@028

VERSE LII. If your contention that the celebrated masters

conversant with the content and value of moral acts have enunciated

the exact character of each such act be true, then you are

under the obligation to demonstrate each such act and its content

by way of distinct specification.

For instance, you will have to demonstrate that these are the

moral acts and this is their content; this is morally good cognition

and this its character. But such differentiation and specification

have not been enunciated by the teachers of the tradition. The

truth of the matter is that a thing and its character cannot be

disentangled because they are ultimate unanalysable facts. So

though these acts are also admitted by all followers of tradition,

including## na#ga#rjuna ##himself, it is not admitted by the latter that

they have got intrinsic reality and distinctive character undetermined

by a chain of cause and conditions. This is going to be

explained in the next verse.

VERSE LIII. If the character `goodness' of the good acts and

states is produced by a previous chain of causes and conditions,

then this character will not be, intrinsic to those acts and states,

but will be an external fact, and as such it cannot be regarded as

an integral factor of its being.

The same law will apply to the morally bad## (akus%a#la) ##acts,

since they are also dependent for their existence upon a previous

causal chain.

VERSE LIV. If these good (and also bad) acts and states are

believed to have an intrinsic reality and nature undetermined by a

definite chain of causes and condition, this will end in proving

the futility of the observance of moral discipline enjoined for

holy life.

If you suppose that good acts do not derive their character of

goodness from antecedent conditions and so also the bad acts their

character of badness. and indifferent acts their character of indifference, and that these characters are distinct and different from the

phenomena in which they are embodied, this will make havoc of

the whole scheme of moral life and discipline. This will lead to

the repudiation of the doctrine of causality. It is the cardinal

@029

doctrine of Buddhist ethics and ontology that every event comes

into existence under the influence of a chain of antecedent condi-

tions. Ethical indeterminism will involve the negation of this Law

of Causation which is believed to be universal in its scope.

Nothing is believed to be undetermined by an antecedent condi-

tion in Buddhist pholosophy. An undetermined phenomenon will

either be an eternal verity or a fiction, as has been observed by

Udayana. But all ethical actions and states are believed to be deter-

mined by a definite set of causal conditions. It has, therefore, been

declared by the Master "One who comprehends the Law of Causa-

tion## (pratityasamutpa#da) ##understands the religious truth (Dharma)."

It follows as a corollary from this assertion that moral acts and

religious values cannot be causally undetermined. If indeter-

minism is conceded in the ethical plane, the odservance of the

rules of holy life will have no consequence.

Not only this. The denial of the law of causality will lead to

the abrogation of the four Noble Truths. The origination of

suffering is a case of causality. The denial of causality will ipso

facto lead to the denial of origination of suffering. If there be no

origination there can be no suffering. Suffering also is dependent

upon a cause for its existence. In the absence of suffering and

its origin and the condition thereof, there will be no raison d' etre

of annihilation of suffering. Annihilation of suffering presupposes

the actual existence of suffering. And the repudiation of such

annihilation will make enlightenment which is the way to this goal

absolutely nugatory. Thus the admission of uncaused goodness

of its opposite will subvert the whole course of spiritual discipline

laid down in the scripture and the whole institution of monastic

brotherhood## (san*gha), ##which is one of the pillars of Buddhism as

religion, will be reduced to a mockery and fraud.

VERSE LV. If your contention were true, there would be no

vice (evil), no virtue (good), nor even the conventional activi-

ties (individual and social). All things would have to be

believed to be eternal being possessed of an intrinsic reality,

since they would not be determined by causes and conditions.

Well, these are the serious consequences of the repudiation of

the law of causation. There would be no good action, nor a bad

@030

one. And all the empirical and conventional laws of social and

individual conduct would lose their validity. Why so ? The answer

is that each and all of them are determined by antecedent causes

and conditions. The denial of the law of causation which is the

raisan d' etre of all things will deprive all these facts of their title

to existence. If, on the other hand, they are believed to be

possessed of intrinsic and self-sufficient reality undetermined by

any cause and condition, they will have to be accepted as eternal

verities existing in their own right and suffering no change of

lapse. The consequence of this preposterous doctrine will be the

utter futility of all moral and spiritual discipline and endeavour.

This will also be a case of flagrant contradiction of the universally

accepted truths of the Buddhist Faith. The master has declared

without reservation and beyond the possibility of doubt that

all that exist are impermanent.

VERSE LVI. The same vicious consequence will invalidate the

acts which are morally evil of are asserted to be conducive to the

emancipation from metempsychosis, And consequently all

impermanent things will transpire to be permanent entities. The

selfsame logic, which has proved the moral value of the good to

be impossible of eternally existent, will also entail the same con-

sequences with regard to evil, indifferent and the liberating acts.

And thus everything that is observed to be subject to origination

and destruction will have to be regarded as bereft of these chara-

cteristics. They will be in your theory eternal and unalterable

verities. The result will be the negation of all moral and religious

activities. So this cannot be an acceptable Interpretation.

As regards the realist's contention that in the absence of the

intrinsic reality of things, the whole system of nomenclature will

be reduced to nonsense as no name can be attached to an unreal

fact, we give the following reply.

VERSE LVII. Well, one who affirms that names are inherently

significant and real will be under the obligation to admit that the

thing bearing the name is also possessed of intrinsic reality. We

are not concerned over it, since we do not assert that a name has

any intrinsic reality.

@031

It is you, the realist, who affirm that names have intrinsic

reality. The onus of proof of the reality of the thing which bears

the name rests upon you. You will have to accept the logical

consequence that is entailed by the reality of the name. Certainly,

the name must refer to a real entity if it is to be real. But so far

as our position stands, we cannot subscribe to this view. The

name also is believed by us to be bereft of intrinsic reality. It is

thus an unreal appearance. So the whole contention of the

realist collapes like a house of cards.

VERSE LVIII. Moreover, if the name be admitted to be an

unreal convention, let it be considered whether it can refer to a

real or unreal entity. Whether it be referred to a real or an unreal,

your thesis will fair to materialize in either case.

An unreal name cannot attach either to a real or an unreal

thing. Both these alternatives will lead to the abrogation of the

thesis. Certainly, a real cannot have an unreal name. That would

imply that the name which is unreal is real-which is a contradic-

tion in terms. If the unreal name be supported to attach to an

unreal entity, that would be a downright nonsense. There can

be no occasion for naming an unreal fiction. So the whole argu-

ment based upon nomenclature topples down.

VERSES LIX. Further, all things have already been proved to be

devoid of intrinsic reality. So this censure relates to a position

which is not asserted by us.

Well, we have taken elaborate pains to establish the intrinsic

unreality of all that exists. The establishment of the thesis eo ipso

involves the unreality of names. But you misunderstand the whole

thing and taking your stand upon the reality of the custom of

naming elect to accuse me of the absurdity of attaching real

names to unreal things. This is nothing short of perversion of my

position. I never affirm the reality of names. So this censure

does not assail me in the least. It on the contrary, implies that

you are fighting against a figment of your imagination.

As regards your charge that the admission of intrinsic reality

outside the circle of existent things lays an obligation upon me

for the demonstration of an entity possessing this reality, the

answer is :

@032

VERSE LX. It has been presumed that I made the assertion

that reality exists, though not in the existent things. But this is

entirely far from the truth, and so the presumption has no basis.

We neither refute the reality of things. nor assert the reality of

anything outside the pale of existents. So the entire animadver-

sion upon me is inspired by a perverted belief that I endorse the

reality of anything other than the existents, and consequently the

onus of proof of such a thing lies on my shoulder. This is of a

piece with the previous censures, and requires no answer from us.

As regards the charge that negation presupposes the reality of

the negatum and thus the negation of reality of things presup-

poses the previous affirmation of it on the part of the absolutist,

the answer is stated below.

VERSE LXI. If negation is relevant only to an existent fact,

the doctrine of## s*u#nyata# ##is established by your denial. You are

can did in the denial of the doctrine of the intrinsic unreality of

things.

If your position that negation is possible only of a real existent

and not of an unreal fiction be true, your denial of the doctrine

of intrinsic unreality of things will end in the establishment of the

truth of the doctrine. Your denial of intrinsic unreality will have

for its presupposition the truth of the negatum. Thus you will be

a convert to the credo of the absolutist.

VERSE LXII. You negate the doctrine of## s*u#nyata# ##and at the same

time affirm that## s*u#nyata# ##does not exist. By this, your thesis

that negation is admissible only in respect of a real negatum is

automatically relinquished.

You seek to refute the absolutist's position of the intrinsic

unreality of things, which is called## s*u#nyata#. ##And at the same time

you assert that## s*u#nyata# ##is an impossibility. This runs counter to

your thesis that negation is always possible only of a real existent

and not of a non-existent. Your denial of## s*u#nyata# ##should pre-

suppose its reality from your standpoint.

VERSE LXIII. Furthermore, I do not undertake to negative any

position, nor do I believe in the reality of any negatum. So when

you charge me "you negative it", you indulge in false and futile

recrimination.

@033

##Were it a fact that I undertook to negative any position or fact,

then certainly you would be justified in advancing this charge

against me. As regards your contention that the negatum must

be a real fact, it will suffice to observe that there is nothing to

be negated by me. So the question of reality or unreality of the

negatum has no raison d'etre so far as I am concerned. when it

is established that all entities are destitute of intrinsic reality and

consequently a real negatum or a real negation are only figments

of a muddled intellect, the accusation that I, as an exponent of

this philosophy, am guilty of contradicting a real fact is not only

unfair but also defamatory. And it is a false defamation at that.

As regards the charge formulated in verse XII that if there be

no reality then the argument denying reality of things is without

a purpose, for a non-existent fiction does not require any argu-

ment to prove its unreality, our answer is :

VERSE LXIV. You contond that the non-existence of a fiction

is proved by itself and does not stand in need of a negative pro-

position to affirm it and so the assertion of this negation does not

carry any meaning. To this our reply is that the assertion only

makes known that it (an existent) is unreal. Certainly, it (assertion)

does not by virtue of its causal efficincy bring about the

cessation of reality.

You contend that a non-existent fiction does not require any

statement, much less an argument, to prove its unreality. A fiction

(say a square circle) stands contradicted by itself. What purpose

is then served by your assertion : "All that exists is destitute of

reality" ? Our answer is : Well, our assertion does not propose to

rob things of their reality, thus serving to make unreal what its

real. It only serves to make manifest the truth that things are

devoid of intrinsic reality, as reality is not capable of being dis-

cerned in any of them. This can be brought home by an apt

illustration. Suppose that when Devadatta is absent from his

home, somebody asserts "Devadatta is at home". A knowledge-

able person corrects him by saying "No, he is not at home", This

corrective does not actually make Devadatta non-existent at home,

but only communicates his factual absence from home. Analo-

gously the assertion "There is no reality in anything" does no

@034

make things unreal, but only communicates the absence of reality

which is true of all that is found to exist.

As regards the animadversion delivered in the four consecutive

verses No. XIII to XVI, we give the following reply :

VERSE LXV. You have delivered a protracted discourse making

the example of the mirage your basis. Listen to our clarification of

the issue how that example becomes perfectly appropriate.

VERSE LXVI. If the erroneous belief in the water in the mirage

were possessed of an intrinsic reality, it would not be produced

by any cause. Where as this belief is brought in to being by a set

of definite conditions and causes, it must be an Instance of the

doctrine of## s*u#nyata#.

##If the illusion of water in the mirage were possessed of an

intrinsic reality, it would not be produced by a set of causal condi-

tions. But it is brought into existence by a set of definite condi-

tions, viz., the mirage, the misdirected vision and unvigilant menta-

lity and unfounded belief## (ayoniso manaska#ra). ##Being produced

under the stress of a definite set of causal conditions, the pheno-

menon cannot obviously be credited with intrinsic reality. This

has been plainly established in the foregoing discourse.

VERSE LXVII. Furthermore, if this mistaken belief were existent

in its own reality and nature, who would be able to combat it ?

As regards the remaining charges, they are only consequential

and accordingly lie exposed to this very line of criticism. So the

censure you pronounce falls short of the target, so far as I am

intended to be.

If the perception of water in mirage be possessed of an intrinsic

reality of its own, it will not be susceptible to contradiction. To be

sure, the nature of things cannot be cancelled and contradicted.

For instance, the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the non-resis-

tance of space are naturally inherent and thus not capable of being

cancelled. But this mistaken belief under consideration admits of

concellation and rebuttal and so must be believed to be devoid

of reality, This line of argument will also apply to the object.

the subject and the rest and will prove that they also cannot lay

any claim to intrinsic reality. The sixfold dialectic based upon

@035

the assumption of the reality of the belief consequently turns out

to be a pleasant illusion. As regards the charge of the unreality

of the logical ground, our answer to it is :

VERSE LXVIII. The charge of the unreality of the logical ground

stands refuted by this very line of reasoning, The line of argu-

ment that has been employed to refute the sixfold dialectic should

also be adopted in the case under consideration.

VERSE LXIX. The reason advanced by the realist to prove

the impossibility of negation in all the three divisions of time

stands refuted in advance, since the position covered is precisely

identical. On the contrary, the reason asserting the impossibility

of negation in all the three divisions of time will be welcomed

and endorsed by the advocate of the universal unreality of things.

The reason advanced by the realist to refute the possibility of

negation in the three divisions of time ought to be regarded as

refuted in advance. Why so, you may ask ? The answer is that you

set out to prove that negation of the reality of things by the abso-

lutist is impossible. Granted that the argument is successful, what

is the result you achieve by it ? Your success would imply that

your negation of the absolutists' position is correct. The absolutist

negates the reality of things and you negate this negation. The

absolutist's negation is impossible according to your argument,

and if so how will your negation of this negation be in a different

position ? If negation as such be logically impossible, your negation

of this impossible negation will also have no logic to support

it. In other words, in the absence of the negation of reality, which

the absolutist seeks to prove, your negation will have no object

to negate. That being so, your contention that the absolutist's

negation stands negated proves to be a hollow unmeaning propo-

sition.

On the contrary, the reason you employ to prove the unreality

and impossibility of negation as a fact will come handy to the

absolutist. You will establish the thesis of the absolutist who

endorses the unreality of all things including that of negation.

Negation and affirmation are equally unreal according to the

absolutist and when you prove the unreality of negation, you are

@036

unwillingly playing the role of an advocate of the absolutist's

position. You are not conscious the you are destroying your own

case.

The assertion that the realist's reason of the impossibility of

negation in the three divisions of time stands refuted may admit

of an alternative explanation.

The argument has already been disposed of in Verse LXIII in

which the absolutist disclaims all responsibility for the conseque-

ntial presupposition of the negatum.

Suppose despite these decisive arguments, the realist would

insist on the reality of negation in the three divisions of time.

He may assert that there may be a cause which is antecedent, which

is subsequent and which is synchronous. Thus, for instance, the

father is the antecedent cause of the son; the pupil is the subse-

quent cause of the teacher; {1. The idea seems to be that the status and function of the teacher

are relative to those of pupil. A person cannot become a teacher

unless he has a pupil to teach. The tutelage of the pupil is thus

a determinant condition of the attainment of the status of tea-

cher in spite of the fact that it is a subsequent event in the ehro-

nological scale. The priority of the pupil is only logical.}; and the lamp is the synchronous

cause of illumination. Negation and negatum also stand in causal

relation. The impossibility of negation, either as a causal determ-

inant or as a determinate effect, shows that negation of anything,

far less of the reality of all things, is not logically tenable.

The absolutist would rejoin "Does the realist believe in the

reality of negation ?" If the answer be in the affirmative all

the three absurdities demonstrated by him will a fortiori stare him

in the face. If the answer be in the negative, he will fail in his

self-appointed task of refuting the position of the absolutist. The

absolutist does not disguise his disbelief in the reality of things.

And the negation of all entites is his mission. If the realist is to

negate this negation, he cannot escape the charges put forward

by him. Moreover, if the realist believes in the reality and poss-

ibility of negation, he will go back upon his thesis. And this

@037

admission of his part will leave open the possibility of the nega-

tion of reality of all things to the absolutist.

VERSE LXX. All activities and interests will remain in a secure

position for a person, who believes in the ultimate truth of## s*u#nyata#

##as expounded in this work. Nothing will be safe and secure for

the man who does not subscribe to## s*u#nyata# ##as the final estimate

of truth.

All interests, mundane and extra-mundane, will be perfectly

safeguarded to the person who believes in the universal truth of##

s*u#nyata#. ##One may enquire how and why all these interests, social

intellectual, religious and ethical, will receive their justification and

fulfilment from this philosophy ? The answer is obvious. The

law of causation, on which the whole Buddhist discipline is foun-

ded, can find its rational justification from this philosophy alone.

If the law of causation is vindicated, the four Noble Truths, which

constitue the bedrock of moral and spiritual disciplines, will stand

vindicated as verities. The four noble truths will make safe p

vision for the spiritual and empirical results of monastic life. The

latter will ensure the attainment of all excellences, including final

emanacipation. To such an enlightened person the truth of the

triple jewel, viz.. the Buddha, the law and the Monastic Order, will

become a matter of transparent and unassailable conviction. The

believer in the truth of the law of causation will automatically

believe in the truth of dharma (moral excellence), the cause of

it and the effect of it. He will consequently believs in adharma

(moral degradation), the cause of it and the effects of it. The

believer in dharma and adharma, and their causes and effects, will

naturally believe in the passions and defilements, their causes and

effects. To the believer in all these events. the belief in the disti-

nction of higher and lower courses of life, the attainment of these

states of existence, the way to these states, the deliverance from

them and the means of deliverance therefrom, will come naturally

and with unwavering certitude. Even the mundane laws of indi-

vidual conduct, social behaviour, political affiliations and every

rule and regulation for the profitable and useful conduct of the

affairs of life will have their metaphysical justification and expla

@038

their meaning and significance from this law. The whole truth,

which we have sedulously endevoured to expound in this book, has been stated in a nutshell in the verse :

"I offer my obeisance to the Enlightened One who is without a

peer, who has declared the## s*u#nyata#, ##Law of Causation and the

Middle path are identical in import."

Here ends the work of the venerable teacher## na#ga#rjuna.

@039

svopajn~avr%ttiyuta#

vigrahavya#vartani#

[s*u#nyata#ya#m% prama#n%asiddhi:]

@040

[##BLANK PAGE##]

@041

vigrahavya#vartani#

[s*u#nyata#ya#m% prama#n%asiddhi:]

pu#rvapaks%a:

1. bha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#vata# (s*u#nyata#) na yukta#

(1) va#divacanasya s*u#nyatva#t

sarves%a#m% bha#vana#m% sarvatra na vidyata svabha#vas*cet |

tvadvacanamasvabha#vam% na nivartayitum% svabha#vamalam ||1||

yadi sarves%a#m% bha#va#na#m% hetau pratyayes%u ca hetupratyayasa#magrya#m% ca pr%thak ca

sarvatra svabha#vo na vidyata iti kr%tva#-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti; nahi bi#je

hetubhu#te'n*kuro'sti, na pr%thivyaptejova#yva#di#na#mekaikasmin pratyayasam%jn~ite, na

pratyayes%u samagres%u, na hetupratyayasa#magrya#m, na hetupratyayavinirmukta: pr%thageva ca |

yasma#datra sarvatra svabha#vo na#sti tasma#nni:svabha#vo'n*kura: | yasma#nni:svabha#va-

stasma#cchu#nya: | yatha# ca#yaman*kuro ni:svabha#vo ni:svabha#vatva#cca s*u#nya:, tatha#

sarvabha#va# api ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#: |

atra vayam% {1. bha#vasvabha#vava#dina ityartha: |} bru#ma:- yadyevam, tava#pi vacanam yadetat-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:'

iti, tadapi s*u#nyam | kim% ka#ran%am ? tadapi hetau na#sti maha#bhu#tes%u samprayuktes%u

viprayuktes%u va#, pratyayes%u na#styura:kan%t%haus%t%hajihva#dantamu#lata#luna#sika#- mu#rddhaprabhr%tis%u yatnes%u {2. yannaiva-ra#^ |} ubhayasa#magrya#m% na#sti, hetupratyayasa#magri#vinirmuktam%

pr%thageva ca na#sti | yasma#datra sarvatra na#sti, tasma#nni:svabha#vam | yasma#nni:-

svabha#vam% tasma#cchu#nyam | tasma#danena sarvabha#vasvabha#vavya#vartanamas*akyam% karttum |

kim% ka#ran%am ? na hyasata#gnina# s*akyam% dagdhum, na hyasata# s*astren%a s*akyam%

chettum, na hyasati#bhiradbhi: s*akyam% kledayitum; evamasata# vacanena na s*akya:

sarvabha#vasvabha#vapratis%edha: karttum ||1||

@042

(2) pratijn~a#ha#ne:

tatra yaduktam-`sarvabha#vasvabha#va: pratis%iddha:' iti, tanna |

atha sasvabha#vametad va#kyam% pu#rva# hata# pratijn~a# te |

vais%amikatvam% tasmin, vis*es%ahetus*ca vaktavya: ||2||

atha#pi manyase-ma# bhu#des%a dos%a iti sasvabha#vametadva#kyam, sasvabha#vatva#-

cca#s*u#nyam; tasma#danena sarvabha#vasvabha#va: pratis%iddha iti ?

atra bru#ma:-yadyevam, ya# te pu#rva# pratijn~a#-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti,

hata# sa# |

kin~ca#nyat, sarvabha#va#ntargatan~ca tvadvacanam | kasma#t s*u#nyes%u sarva-

bha#ves%u tvadvacanamas*u#nyam, yena#s*u#nyatva#t sarvabha#vasvabha#va: pratis%iddha: ? evam%

s%at%kot%iko va#da: prasakta: | sa puna: kathamiti ?

1. hanta cet puna: s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:, tena tvadvacanam% s*u#nyam; sarvabha#va#nta-

rgatatva#t tvadvacanasya | tena s*u#nyena pratis%edha#nupapatti: | tatra ya: pratis%edha:-

`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, so'nupapanna: |

2. upapannas*cet puna: `s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti pratis%edha:, tena tvadvacanama-

pyas*u#nyam | as*u#nyatva#danena pratis%edho'nupapanna: |

3. atha s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#stvadvacana ca#s*u#nyam, yena pratis%edha:, tena tvadvacanam%

sarvatra#sam%gr%hi#tam ? tatra dr%s%t%a#ntavirodha: |

4. sarvatra cetpuna: sam%gr%hi#tam% tvadvacanam, sarvabha#va#s*ca s*u#nya#:, tena tadapi

s*u#nyam | s*u#nyatva#danena na#sti pratis%edha: |

5. atha s*u#nyam, asti ca#nena pratis%edha:-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tena

s*u#nya# api sarvabha#va#: ka#ryakriya#samartha# bhaveyu: ! na caitadis%t%am |

6. atha s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#: na ca ka#ryakriya#samartha# bhavanti, ma# bhu#d

dr%s%t%a#ntavirodha iti kr%tva#, s*u#nyena tvadvacanena sarvabha#vasvabha#vapratis%edho nopapanna

iti |

kin~ca#nyat, evam% tadastitva#d vais%amikatvaprasan*ga:- kin~cicchu#nyam,

kin~cidas*u#nyamiti | tasmim%s*ca vais%amikatve vis*es%aheturvaktavyo yena kin~ci-

cchu#nyam, kin~cidas*u#nyam% sya#t | sa ca nopadis%t%o hetu: | tatra yaduktam-`s*u#nya#:

sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna ||2||

kin~ca#nyat,

ma# s*abdavadityetat sya#tte buddhirna caitadupapannam |

s*abdena hyatra sata# bhavis%yato va#ran%am% tasya ||3||

@043

sya#tte buddhi:-yatha# na#ma kas*cid bru#ya#t-ma# s*abdam% ka#rs%i#riti svayameva

s*abdam% kurya#t, tena ca s*abdena tasya s*abdasya vya#vartanam% kriyet; evameva `s*u#nya#:

sarvabha#va#:' iti s*u#nyena vacanena sarvabha#vasvabha#vasya vya#vartanam% kriyata iti ?

atra vayam% bru#ma:-etadapyanupapannam | kim% ka#ran%am ? sata# hyatra s*abdena

bhavis%yata: s*abdasya pratis%edha: kriyate | na punariha bhavata: sata# vacanena sarva-

bha#vasvabha#vapratis%edha: kriyate | tava hi matena vacanamapyasat, sarvabha#vasvabha#vo-

'pyasan | tasma#dayam% ma# s*abdavaditi vis%amopanya#sa:-asanniti ||3||

kin~ca,

pratis%edhapratis%edho'pyevamiti matam% bhavettadasadeva |

evam% tava pratijn~a# laks%an%ato du#s%yate, na mama ||4||

sya#tte buddhi:-pratis%edhapratis%edho'pyanenaiva kalpena#nupapanna:, tatra yadbhava#n

sarvabha#vasvabha#vapratis%edhavacanam% pratis%edhayati, tadanupapannamiti ?

atra vayam% bru#ma:-etasadapyasadeva | kasma#t ? tava hi etat pratijn~a#-

laks%an%apra#ptam% na mama | bhava#n bravi#ti-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, na#ham |

tasma#ttavaiva#yam% pu#rvaka: paks%o na mama |

`tatra yaduktam-pratis%edhapratis%edho'pyevam% satyanupapanna:' iti, tanna ||4||

kin~ca#nyat,

pratyaks%en%a hi ta#vad yadyupalabhya vinivartayasi bha#va#n |

tanna#sti pratyaks%am% bha#va# yenopalabhyante ||5||

yadi pratyaks%ata: sarvabha#va#nupalabhya bha#va#nnivartayati-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#'

iti, tadanupapannam | kasma#t ? pratyaks%amapi hi prama#n%am% sarvabha#va#ntargatatva#t

s*u#nyam | yo bha#va#nupalabhate so'pi s*u#nya: | tasma#t pratyaks%en%a prama#n%ena nopa-

lambhabha#va:, anupalabdhasya ca pratis%edha#nupapatti: | tatra yaduktam-`s*u#nya#:

sarvabha#va#:' iti, tadanupapannam ||5||

(3) prama#n%a#siddhe:

sya#tte buddhi:-anuma#nena#gamenopama#nena va# sarvabha#va#nupalabhya sarvabha#va-

vya#vartanam% kriyata iti ? atra bru#ma:-

anuma#nam% pratyuktam% pratyaks%en%a#gamopama#ne ca |

anuma#na#gamasa#dhya# ye'rtha# dr%s%t%a#ntasa#dhya#s*ca ||6||

anuma#nopama#na#gama#s*ca pratyaks%en%a prama#n%ena pratyukta#: | yatha# hi pratyaks%am%

prama#n%am% s*u#nyam, sarvabha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatva#t; evamanuma#nopama#na#gama# api s*u#nya#:;

@044

sarvabha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatva#t | ye'numa#nasa#dhya# artha#:, a#gamasa#dhya#:, upama#nasa#-

dhya#s*ca, te'pi s*u#nya#:; sarvabha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatva#t | anuma#nopama#na#gamais*ca yo

bha#va#nupalabhate so'pi s*u#nya: | tasma#dbha#va#na#mupalambha#bha#vo'nupalabdha#na#m% ca

svabha#vapratis%edha#nupapatti: | tatra yaduktam-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti,

tanna ||6||

2. bha#va#na#m% sasvabha#vata# yukta#

(ka) kus*ala#didharma#n%a#m% kus*ala#disvabha#vata#bhyupagama#t

kin~ca#nyat,

kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% dharma#vastha#vidas*ca manyante |

kus*alam% jana#: svabha#vam% s*es%es%vapyes%a viniyoga: ||7||

iha jana# dharma#vastha#vido manyante kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#mekonavim%s*as*atam |

tadyatha#-ekades*o vijn~a#nasya vedana#ya#: sam%jn~a#ya#s*cetana#ya#: spars*asya manasika#-

rasya chandasya adhimoks%asya vi#ryasya smr%te: sama#dhe: prajn~a#ya# upeks%a#ya#: prayogasya

samprayogasya pra#pteradhya#s*ayasya apratighasya ratervyavasa#yasyautsukyasyonmugdhe:

utsa#hasya#vigha#tasya vas*ita#ya#: pratigha#tasya#vipratisa#rasya parigrahasya#pari-

grahasya ..dhr%teravyavasa#yasya#nautsukyasya#nunmugdheranutsa#hasya pra#rthana#ya#: pran%idhe-

rmadasya vis%aya#n%a#m% viprayogasya anairya#n%ikata#ya# utpa#dasya sthiteranityata#ya#:

samanva#gamasya jara#ya#: parita#pasya#ratervitarkasya pri#te: prasa#dasya...premn%a:

pratiku#lasya pradaks%in%agra#hasya vais*a#radyasya gauravasya citri#ka#rasya bhakterabhakte:

s*us*ru#s%a#ya# a#darasya#na#darasya pras*rabdherha#sasya va#co vispandana#ya#: siddhasya#-

prasa#dasya#pras*rabdhe:, da#ks%asya sauratyasya vipratisa#rasya s*okasyopa#ya#sa#ya#sasya

..apradaks%in%agra#hasya sam%s*ayasya sam%vara#n%a#m% paris*uddhedhya#tmasamprasa#dasya bhi#ruta#ya#:,

s*raddha# hri#ra#rjavamavan~canamupas*amo'ca#palamapramodo ma#rdavam% pratisam%khya#nam% nirvairapa-

rida#ha#vamado'lobho'dves%o'moha: sarvajn~ata#pratini:sargo vibhavo'patra#pyamapari

ccha#danam% ma#nanam% ka#run%yam% maitryadi#nata#ran%a#..anupana#ho'ni#rs%ya# cetaso'parya#da#nam%

ks%a#ntirvyavasargo'sauratyam% paribhoga#nvaya: pun%yamasam%jn~isama#pattinairya#n%ikata#-

sarvajn~ata#sam%skr%ta# dharma#:-ityekonavim%s*as*atam% kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% kus*ala: svabha#va: |

tatha#'kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#makus*ala: svabha#va:, nivr%ta#vya#kr%ta#na#m% nivr%ta#-

vya#kr%ta:, prakr%tavya#kr%ta#na#m% prakr%ta#vya#kr%ta:, ka#mokta#na#m% ka#mokta:, ru#pokta#na#m%

ru#pokta:, a#ru#pyokta#na#ma#ru#pyokta:, ana#srava#n%a#mana#srava:, du:khasamudaya-

nirodhama#rgokta#na#m% du:khasamudayanirodhama#rgokta:, bha#vana#praha#tavya#na#m% bha#vana#-

praha#tavya:, apraha#tavya#na#mapraha#tavya: | yasma#devamanekapraka#ro dharmasvabha#vo

@045

dr%s%t%astasma#d yaduktam-"ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va# ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#:'

iti, tanna ||7||

kin~ca#nyat,

nairya#n%ikasvabha#vo dharma# naiya#n%ika#s*ca ye tes%a#m |

dharma#vasthokta#na#mevamanairya#n%ika#di#na#m ||8||

iha ca dharma#vasthokta#na#m% nairya#n%ika#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% nairya#n%ika: svabha#va:, anai-

rya#n%ika#na#manairya#n%ika:, bodhyan*gika#na#m% bodhyan*gika:, abodhyan*gika#na#ma-

bodhyan*gika:, bodhipaks%ika#n%a#m% bodhipaks%ika:, abodhipaks%ika#n%a#mabodhipaks%ika: |

evamapi s*es%a#n%a#m | tadyasma#devamanekapraka#ro dharma#n%a#m% svabha#vo dr%s%t%astasma#d

yaduktam-`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va# ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#:' iti, tanna ||8||

(2) nirvastukasya na#ma#bha#va#t

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca na bhavet svabha#vo dharma#n%a#m% ni:svabha#va ityeva |

na#ma#pi bhavennaiva na#ma hi nirvastukam% na#sti ||9||

yadi sarvadharma#n%a#m% svabha#vo na bhavettatra#pi ni:svabha#vo bhavet | tatra

`ni:svabha#va:' ityevam% na#ma#pi na bhavet | kasma#t ? nirvastukam% na#ma hi kin~cidapi

na#sti | tasma#nna#masadbha#va#t svabha#vo bha#va#na#masti, svabha#vasadbha#va#cca#-

s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#: | tasma#d yaduktam-`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va# ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#:'

iti, tanna ||9||

3. pratis%edha#siddhe:

(ka) dharmairvina# svabha#va#pratis%edha#t

kin~ca#nyat,

atha vidyate svabha#va: sa ca dharma#n%a#m% na vidyate tasma#t |

dharmairvina# svabha#va: sa yasya tad yuktamupades%t%um ||10||

atha manyase-`ma# bhu#davastukam% na#ma' iti kr%tva#'sti svabha#va:, sa punardharma#n%a#m%

na sambhavati, evam% dharmas*u#nyata# ni:svabha#vatva#d dharma#n%a#m% siddha#

bhavis%yati, na ca nirvastukam% na#meti ?

atra vayam% bru#ma:-evam% yasyeda#ni#m% sa svabha#vo dharmavinirmuktasya#rthasya sa

yuktamupades%t%umartha: | sa ca nopadis%t%a: | tasma#d ya# kalpana#-`asti svabha#vo na

sa punardharma#n%a#m' iti, sa# hi#na# |

@046

(kha) sadbha#va#nabhyupagama#t

kin~ca#nyat,

sata eva pratis%edho na#sti ghat%o geha ityayam% yasma#t |

dr%s%t%a: pratis%edho'yam% sata: svabha#vasya te tasma#t ||11||

iha ca sato'rthasya pratis%edha: kriyate, na#sata: | tadyatha# `na#sti ghat%o gehe'

iti sato ghat%asya pratis%edha: kriyate, na#sata: | evameva `na#sti svabha#vo dharma#n%a#m'

iti sata: svabha#vasya pratis%edha: pra#pnoti, na#sata: | tatra yaduktam-

`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna; pratis%edhasambhava#deva sarvabha#vasvabha#vo-

'pratis%iddha: ||11||

kin~ca#nyat,

atha na#sti sa svabha#va: kim% nu pratis%idhyate tvaya#nena !

vacanenarte vacana#t pratis%edha: sidhyati hyasata: ||12||

atha `na#styeva sa svabha#va:' anena vacanena `ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#' iti

kim% bhavata# pratis%idhyate ? asato hi vacana#dvina# siddha: pratis%edha:, tadyatha#-

agne: s*aityasya, apa#maus%n%yasya ||12||

kin~ca#nyat,

ba#la#na#miva mithya# mr%gatr%s%n%a#ya#m% yatha# jalagra#ha: |

evam% mithya#gra#ha: sya#tte pratis%edhato hyasata: ||13||

sya#tte buddhi:-yatha# ba#la#na#m% mr%gatr%s%n%a#ya#m% mithya# jalamiti gra#ho bhavati,

nanu nirjala# sa# mr%gatr%s%n%eti tatra pan%d%itaja#ti#yena purus%en%ocyate tasya gra#hasya

vinivartana#rtham | evam% ni:svabha#ves%u ya: svabha#ve gra#ha: sattva#na#m% tasya vya#varta-

na#rtham-`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' ityucyata iti ? ||13||

(ga) gra#ha#dis%at%ka#svi#ka#ra#t

atra bru#ma:-

nanvevam% satyasti gra#ho gra#hyam% ca tadgrahi#ta# ca |

pratis%edha: pratis%edhyam% pratis%eddha# ceti s%at%kam% tat ||14||

yadyevam, 1. asti ta#vatsattva#na#m% gra#ha:, 2. asti gra#hyam, 3. santi ca

tadgrahi#ta#ra:; 4. asti pratis%edhastasya#pi mithya#gra#hasya, 5. asti pratis%edhyam% yadidam% mithya#gra#ho na#ma, 6. santi ca pratis%eddha#ro yus%mada#dayo'sya gra#hasya-

iti siddham% s%at%kam | tasya s%at%kasya siddhatva#d yaduktam-`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:'

iti, tanna ||14||

@047

atha naiva#sti gra#ho naiva gra#hyam% na ca grahi#ta#ra: |

pratis%edha: pratis%edhyam% pratis%eddha#ro nanu na santi ||15||

atha ma# bhu#des%a dos%a iti kr%tva# naiva gra#ho'sti naiva gra#hyam% na ca grahi#ta#ra:

ityevam% sati gra#hasya ya: pratis%edha:-`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, so'pi

na#sti, pratis%edhyamapi na#sti, pratis%eddha#ro'pi na santi |

pratis%edha: pratis%edhyam% pratis%eddha#ras*ca yadyuta na santi |

siddha# hi sarvabha#va#stes%a#meva svabha#vas*ca ||16||

yadi ca na pratis%edho-na pratis%eddha#ra:, santyapratis%iddha#: sarvabha#va#:, asti

ca sarvabha#va#na#m% svabha#va: ||16||

(gha) nirhetutva#t

kin~ca#nyat,

hetos*ca te na siddhirnai:svabha#vya#t kuto hi te hetu: ?

nirhetukasya siddhirna copapanna#sya te'rthasya ||17||

`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' ityetasminnarthe te hetorasiddhi: | kim% ka#ran%am ?

ni:svabha#vatva#ddhi sarvabha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatva#ttato hetu: kuta: ! asati hetau nirhetukasya#rthasya

`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti kuta eva prasiddhi: ! tatra yaduktam-

`s*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna ||17|| kin~ca#nyat, 

yadi ca#heto: siddhi: svabha#vavinivartanasya te bhavati |

sva#bha#vyasya#stitatvam% mama#pi nirhetukam% siddham ||18||

atha manyase-nirhetuki# (ka#) siddhirni:svabha#vatvasya bha#vana#miti ?

yatha# tava svabha#vavinivartanam% nirhetuka siddham% tatha# mama#pi svabha#vasadbha#vo

nirhetuka: siddha: ||18||

atha `hetorastitvam% bha#va#sva#bha#vyam' ityanupapannam |

lokes%u ni:svabha#vo na hi kas*cana vidyate bha#va: ||19||

iha yadi bha#va#na#m% nai:sva#bha#vyasya hetorastitvam% manyase, `ni:svabha#va#:

sarvabha#va#:' iti, tadanupapannam | kim% ka#ran%am ? na hi loke ni:svabha#va:

kas*cidbha#vo'sti ||19||

4. pratis%edhya#siddhe:

kin~ca#nyat,

pu#rva cet pratis%edha:, pas*ca#t pratis%edhyamityanupapannam |

pas*ca#cca#nupapanno yugapacca yata: svabha#vo'san ||20||

@048

iha pu#rvam% cetpratis%edha: pas*ca#cca pratis%edhyamiti, nai:sva#bha#vyam% nopapannam |

asati hi pratis%edhye kasya pratis%edha: ? atha pas*ca#tpratis%edha: pu#rvam% pratis%edhya-

miti ca nopapannam; siddhe hi pratis%edhye kim% pratis%edha: karoti | atha yugapat

pratis%edha-pratis%edhye iti ? tatha#pi na pratis%edha:; pratis%edhyasya#rthasya ka#ran%am

pratis%edhyo na pratis%edhasya ca | yatha# yugapadutpannayo: s*as*avis%a#n%ayornaiva

daks%in%am% savyasya ka#ran%am% savyam% va# daks%in%asya ka#ran%am% bhavati#ti | tatra yaduktam-

`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna ||20||

siddha#ntapaks%a:

1. bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyata# yukta# (ka)

(1) vacanasya s*u#nyata#svi#ka#re'pi

atrocyate-yatta#vadbhavatoktam

"sarves%a#m% bha#va#na#m% sarvatra na vidyate svabha#vas*cet |

tvadvacanamasvabha#vam% na nivartayitum% svabha#vamalam" || iti || (ka#. 1)

atra bru#ma:-

hetupratyayasa#magrya#m% ca pr%thak ca#pi madvaco na yadi |

nanu s*u#nyatvam% siddham% bha#va#na#masvabha#vatva#t ||21||

yadi madvaco hetau na#sti maha#bhu#tes%u samprayuktes%u viprayuktes%u va# pratyayes%u

na#styura:

n%t%haus%t%hajihva#dantamu#lata#luna#sika#mu#rddhaprabhr%tis%u yatnes%u, nobhayasa#ma-

grya#masti, hetupratyayasa#magri#vinirmuktam% pr%thageva ca na#sti, tasma#nni:sva-

bha#vam, ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nyam | evam% nanu {1. nis*cayenetyartha: |} s*u#nyatvam% siddham% ni:svabha#vatva#dasya

madi#yavacasa: | yatha# caitanmadvacanam% ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nyam% tatha# sarvabha#va# api

ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya# iti ||21||

s*u#nyata#laks%an%am-

tatra yadbhavatoktam% tvadi#yavacasa: s*u#nyatva#cchu#nyata# sarvabha#va#na#m% nopapadyata

iti, tanna; kin~ca#nyat,

yas*ca prati#tyabha#vo bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyateti sa# prokta# |

yas*ca prati#tyabha#vo bhavati hi tasya#svabha#vatvam ||22||

s*u#nyata#rtha ca bhava#n bha#va#na#manavasa#ya pravr%tta upa#lambham% vaktum-`tvadvacanasya

ni:svabha#vatva#dbha#va#na#m% svabha#vapratis%edho nopapadyate' iti | iha hi ya:

@049

prati#tyabha#vo bha#va#na#m% sa# s*u#nyata# | kasma#t ? ni:svabha#vatva#t | ye hi

prati#tyasamutpanna# bha#va#ste na sasvabha#va# bhavanti; svabha#va#bha#va#t | kasma#t ?

hetupratyayasa#peks%atva#t | yadi hi svabha#vato bha#va# bhaveyu:, pratya#khya#ya#pi hetu-

pratyayam% ca bhaveyu: | na caivam% bhavanti; tasma#nni:svabha#va#:, ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#

ityabhidhi#yante |

evam% madi#yamapi vacanam% prati#tyasamutpannatva#nni:svabha#vam% ni:svabha#vatva#-

cchu#nyamityupapannam | yatha# ca prati#tyasamutpannatva#t svabha#vas*u#nya# api

rathapat%aghat%a#daya: sves%u sves%u ka#ryes%u ka#s%t%hatr%n%amr%ttika#haran%amadhu#dakapayasa#m% dha#ran%e

s*i#tava#ta#tapaparitra#n%aprabhr%tis%u vartante, evamidam% madi#yavacanam% prati#tyasamutpanna-

tva#nni:svabha#vamapi ni:svabha#vatvaprasa#dhane bha#va#na#m% vartate; tatra yaduktam-

`ni:svabha#vatva#t tvadi#yavacanasya s*u#nyatva#ttasya ca tena sarvabha#vasvabha#va-

pratis%edho nopapanna:' iti, tanna ||22||

kin~ca#nyat,

nirmitako nirmitakam% ma#ya#purus%a: svama#yaya# sr%s%t%am |

pratis%edhayate yadvat pratis%edho'yam% tathaiva sya#t ||23||

yatha# nirmitaka: purus%o'nyam% nirmitakam% purus%am% kasmim%s*cidarthe vartama#nam% prati-

s%edhayet, ma#ya#ka#ren%a va# sr%s%t%o ma#ya#purus%o'nyam% ma#ya#purus%am% svama#yaya# sr%s%t%am%

kasmim%s*cidarthe vartama#nam% pratis%edhayet; tatra yo nirmitaka: purus%a: pratis%idhyate

so'pi s*u#nya:, ya: pratis%edhayati so'pi s*u#nya:, yo ma#ya#purus%a: pratis%idhyate

so'pi s*u#nya:, ya: pratis%edhayati so'pi s*u#nya:; evameva madvacanena s*u#nyena#pi

sarvabha#va#na#m% svabha#vapratis%edha upapanna: |

s%at%kot%ikava#danira#sa:

tatra yadbhavatoktam-`s*u#nyatva#ttvadvacanasya sarvabha#vasvabha#vapratis%edho nopapanna:'

iti, tanna | tatra yo bhavata# s%at%kot%iko va#da ukta: so'pi tenaiva pratis%iddha: |

naiva hyevam% sati na sarvabha#va#ntargatam% madvacanam, na#styas*u#nyam, na#pi sarvabha#va#

as*u#nya#: ||23||

2. na pratijn~a#ha#ni:

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

"atha sasvabha#vametadva#kyam% pu#rva# hata# pratijn~a# te |

vais%amikatvam% tasmin vis*es%ahetus*ca vaktavya:" || (2 ka#^) iti ?

atra#pi bru#ma:-

na sva#bha#vikametadva#kyam% tasma#nna va#daha#nirme |

na#sti ca vais%amikatvam% vis*es%ahetus*ca na niga#dya: ||24||

@050

na ta#vanmamaitadvacanam% prati#tyasamutpannatva#t svabha#vopapannam | yatha# pu#rva-

muktam-svabha#va#nupapannatva#cchu#nyamiti | yasma#ccedamapi madvacanam% s*u#nyam% s*es%a#

api sarvabha#va#: s*u#nya#:, tasma#nna#sti vais%amikatvam | yadi hi vayam% bru#ma:-`idam%

vacanamas*u#nyam% s*es%a#: sarvabha#va#: s*u#nya#:' iti, tato vais%amikatva sya#t | na caitadevam,

tasma#nna vais%amikatvam | yasma#cca vais%amikatvam% na sambhavati `idam% vacanam-

s*u#nyam% s*es%a#: puna: sarvabha#va#: s*u#nya#:' iti, tasma#dasma#bhirvis*es%aheturna vaktavya:-

`anena hetunedam% vacanamas*u#nyam% sarvabha#va#: puna: s*u#nya#:' iti | tatra yadbhavato-

ktam-`va#daha#niste vais%amikatvam% ca, vis*es%ahetus*ca tvaya# vaktavya:' iti,

tanna ||24||

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

"ma# s*abdavadityetat sya#tte buddhirna caitadupapannam | s*abdena hyatra sata# bhavis%yato va#ran%am% tasya" || (ka#^ 3) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

ma# s*abdavaditi na#yam% dr%s%t%a#nto yastvaya# sama#rabdha: |

s*abdena tacca s*abdasya va#ran%am% naivamevaitat ||25||

na#pyayamasma#kam% dr%s%t%a#nta: | yatha# kas*cit `ma# s*abdam% ka#rs%i#:' iti bruvan s*abdameva

karoti s*abdam% ca pratis%edhayati, tadvat tacchu#nyam% vacanam% na s*u#nyata#m% pratis%edha-

yati | kim% ka#ran%am ? atra hi dr%s%t%a#nte s*abdena s*abdasya vya#vartanam% kriyate | na

caitadevam; vayam% bru#ma:-`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va# ni:svabha#vatva#cchu#nya#:'

iti ||25||

kim% ka#ran%am ?

nai:sva#bha#vya#na#m% cennai:sva#bha#vyena va#ran%am% yadi hi |

nai:sva#bha#vyanivr%ttau sva#bha#vyam% hi prasiddham% sya#t ||26||

yatha# `ma# s*abda ka#rs%i#:' iti s*abdena s*abdasya vya#vartanam% kriyate, evam% yadi

nai:svabha#vyena vacanena nai:sva#bha#vya#na#m% bha#va#na#m% vya#vartanam% kriyeta tato'yam%

dr%s%t%a#nta upapanna: sya#t | iha tu nai:sva#bha#vyena vacanena bha#va#na#m% svabha#vaprati-

s%edha: kriyate | evam% yadi nai:sva#bha#vyena vacanena bha#va#na#m% nai:sva#bha#vyapratis%edha:

kriyeta, nai:sva#bha#vyapratis%iddhatva#deva bha#va#: sasvabha#va# bhaveyu: | sasvabha#va-

tva#das*u#nya#: syu: | s*u#nyata#m% ca vayam% bha#va#na#ma#caks%mahe, na#s*u#nyata#mityadr%s%t%a#nta eva#yamiti ||26||

@051

athava# nirmitaka#ya#m% yatha# striya#m% stri#yamityasadgra#ham {1. striyamitya^-ra#^ |} |

nirmitaka: pratihanya#t kasyacidevam% bhavedetat ||27||

athava# yatha# kasyacitpurus%asya nirmitaka#ya#m% striya#m% svabha#vas*u#nya#ya#m%

parama#rthata: `stri#yam' ityasadgra#ha: sya#t, evam% tasya#m% tena#sadgra#hen%a sa ra#ga-

mutpa#dayet | tatha#gatena va# tatha#gatas*ra#vaken%a va# nirmitako nirmitaka: sya#t |

tatha#gata#dhis%t%ha#nena va# tatha#gatas*ra#vaka#dhis%t%ha#nena va# sa tasya tamasadgra#ham% vinivartayet |

evameva nirmitakopamena s*u#nyena madvacanena nirmitakastri#sadr%s*es%u sarva-

bha#ves%u ni:svabha#ves%u yo'yam% svabha#vagra#ha: sa nivartyate | tasma#dayamatra dr%s%t%a#nta:

s*u#nyata#prasa#dhanam% pratyupapadyama#no netara: ||27||

athava# sa#dhyasamo'yam% heturna hi vidyate dhvane: satta# |

sam%vyavaha#ram% ca vayam% na#nabhyupagamya kathaya#ma: ||28||

ma# s*abdavaditi sa#dhyasama eva#yam% hetu: | kasma#t ? sarvabha#va#na#m% nai:sva#-

bha#vyena#vis*is%t%atva#t | na hi tasya dhvane: prati#tyasamutpannatva#t svabha#vasatta#

vidyate; tasya#: svabha#vasatta#ya# avidyama#natva#t | yaduktam-`s*abdena hyatra

sata# bhavis%yato va#ran%am% tasya' (3 ka#^) iti, tad vya#hanyate |

api ca, na vayam% vyavaha#rasatyamanabhyupagamya vyavaha#rasatyam% pratya#khya#ya

kathaya#ma:-`s*u#nya# sarvabha#va#:' iti | na hi vyavaha#rasatyamana#gamya s*akya#

dharmades*ana# karttum | yathoktam-

"vyavaha#ramana#s*ritya parama#rtho na dr%s*yate |

parama#rthamana#gamya nirva#n%am% na#dhigamyate" || (ma^ s*a#^ 24-10) iti,

tasma#nmadvacanavacchu#nya#: sarvabha#va#:, sarvabha#va#na#m% ca ni:svabha#vatvam-

ubhayathopapadyama#namiti ||28||

yatpurnabhavatoktam-

pratis%edhapratis%edho'pyevamiti matam% bhavet tadasadeva |

evam% tava pratijn~a# laks%an%ato du#s%yate na mama" || (ka#^ 4) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

yadi ka#cana pratijn~a# sya#nme tata es%a me bhaved dos%a: |

na#sti ca mama pratijn~a# tasma#nnaiva#sti me dos%a: ||29||

yadi ca ka#cana mama pratijn~a# sya#t tato mama pratijn~a#laks%an%apra#ptatva#tpu#rvako

dos%o yatha# tvayoktastatha# mama sya#t | na mama ka#cidasti pratijn~a# | tasma#t

@052

sarvabha#ves%u s*u#nyes%vatyantopas*a#ntes%u prakr%tiviviktes%u kuta: pratijn~a# ! kuta:

pratijn~a#laks%an%apra#pti: ! kutas*ca pratijn~a#laks%an%apra#ptikr%to dos%a: !

tatra yadbhavatoktam-`tava pratijn~a#laks%an%apra#ptatva#ttavaiva dos%a:' iti,

tanna ||29||

3. prama#n%asiddhi:

(ka) na ita: prama#n%asiddhi:

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

"pratyaks%en%a hi ta#vadyadyupalabhya vinivartayasi bha#va#n |

tanna#sti pratyaks%am% bha#va# yenopalabhyante" || (5 ka#^)

"anuma#nam% pratyuktam% pratyaks%en%a#gamopama#ne ca |

anuma#na#gamasa#dhya# ye'rtha# dr%s%t%a#ntasa#dhya#s*ca" || (6 ka#^) iti ?

atra vayam% bru#ma:-

yadi kin~cidupalabheyam% pravartayeyam% nivartayeyam% va# |

pratyaks%a#dibhirarthaistadabha#va#nme'nupa#lambha: ||30||

yadyaham% kin~cidarthamupalabheyam% pratyaks%a#numa#nopama#na#gamais*caturbhi: prama#n%ai-

s*caturn%a#m% va# prama#n%a#na#manyatamena, ata eva pravartayeyam% va# nivartayeyam% va# | yato-

'rthameva#ham% kin~cinnopalabhe | tasma#nna pravartaya#mi, na nivartaya#mi |

tatraivam% sati yo bhavatopa#lambha ukta:-yadi pratyaks%a#di#na#m% prama#n%a#na#manya-

tamenopalabhya bha#va#nvinivartayasi, nanu bhavatokta#ni ta#ni prama#n%a#ni na

santi, tais*ca prama#n%airapi gamya# artha# na santi#ti, sa me bhavatyeva#nupa#lambha: ||

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca prama#n%ataste tes%a#m% tes%a#m% prasiddhirartha#na#m |

tes%a#m% puna: prasiddhim% bru#hi katham% te prama#n%a#na#m ||31||

yadi ca prama#n%atastes%a#na#m% tes%a#martha#na#m% prameya#n%a#m% prasiddhim% manyase, yatha# ma#nai-

rmeya#na#m, tes%a#mida#ni#m% pratyaks%a#numa#nopama#na#gama#na#m% caturn%a#m% prama#n%a#na#m% kuta:

prasiddhi: ! ||31||

yadi ta#vannis%prama#n%a#na#m% prama#n%a#na#m% sya#tprasiddhi:, `prama#n%ato'rtha#na#m%

prasiddhi:' iti hi#yate pratijn~a# | tatha#pi-

anyairyadi prama#n%ai: prama#n%asiddhirbhavettadanavastha# |

yadi punarmanyase-prama#n%ai: prameya#n%a#m% prasiddhistes%a#m% prama#n%a#na#manyai: prasiddhi:,

evamanavastha#prasan*ga: | anavastha#prasan*ge ko dos%a: ?

@053

na#de: siddhistatra#sti naiva madhyasya na#ntyasya ||32||

asya#navastha#prasan*ge a#de: siddhirna#sti | kim% ka#ran%am ? tes%a#mapi hi

prama#n%a#na#manyai: prama#n%ai: prasiddhi:, tes%a#manyairiti na#stya#di: | a#derasadbha#va#t

kuto madhyama:, kuto'nta: ! tasma#ttes%a#m% prama#n%a#na#manyai: prama#n%ai: prasiddhiriti

yaduktam% tannopapadyata iti ||32||

tes%a#matha prama#n%airvina# prasiddhirvihi#yate va#da: | vais%amikatvam% tasmin vis*es%ahetus*ca vaktavya: ? ||33||

atha manyase-tes%a#m% prama#n%a#na#m% vina# prama#n%ai: prasiddhi:, prameya#n%a#m% punara-

rtha#na#m% prama#n%ai: prasiddhiriti, evam% sati yaste va#da:-`prama#n%ai: prasiddhirartha#na#m'

iti, sa hi#yate | vais%amikatvam% ca bhavati-kes%a#n~cidartha#na#m% prama#n%ai:

prasiddhi:, kes%a#n~cinneti | vis*es%ahetus*ca vaktavyo yena hetuna# kes%a#n~cidartha#na#m%

prama#n%ai: prasiddhi:, kes%a#n~cinneti | sa ca nopadis%t%a: | tasma#diyamapi kalpana#

nopapanneti ? ||33||

(kha) na#gnivat svata:

atra#ha-prama#n%a#nyeva sva#tma#nam% para#tma#nam% ca prasa#dhayanti | yathoktam-

"dyotayati sva#tma#nam% yatha# huta#s*astatha# para#tma#nam |

svapara#tma#na#vevam% prasa#dhayanti prama#n%a#ni" {1. maha#pan%d%iteneyam% ga#tha# ka#rika#tvena gr%hi#ta# |} || iti

yatha#gni: sva#tma#nam% para#tma#nam% ca praka#s*ayati, tathaiva prama#n%a#ni prasa#dhayanti

sva#tma#nam% para#tma#nan~ceti ?

atrocyate-

vis%amopanya#so'yam% na hya#tma#nam% praka#s*ayatyagni: |

na hi tasya#nupalabdhirdr%s%t%a# tamasi#va kumbhasya ||34||

vis%ama evopanya#sa:-agnivat prama#n%a#ni sva#tma#nam% ca prasa#dhayanti

para#tma#nan~ca prasa#dhayanti#ti | na hyagnira#tma#nam% praka#s*ayati | yatha# {2. yadi hi yatha#-ra#^ |} pra#geva#-

gnina#'praka#s*itastamasi kumbho nopalabhyate, athottaraka#lamupalabhyate'gnina#

praka#s*ita: san; evameva yadyapraka#s*ita: pra#gagnistamasi sya#duttaraka#lamagne:

praka#s*anam% sya#t, ata: sva#tma#nam% praka#s*ayet | na caitadevam | tasma#diyamapi

kalpana# nopapadyata iti ||34||

@054

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca sva#tma#namayam% tvadvacanena praka#s*ayatyagni: |

paramiva nanva#tma#nam% paridhaks%yatyapi huta#s*a: ||35||

yadi ca tvadvacanena yatha# para#tma#nam% praka#s*ayatyagnirevameva sva#tma#namapi

praka#s*ayati, nanu yatha# para#tma#nam% dahatyevameva sva#tma#namapi dhaks%yati | na

caitadevam | tatra yaduktam-`para#tma#namiva sva#tma#namapi praka#s*ayatyagni:'

iti, tanna ||35||

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca svapara#tma#nau tvadvacanena praka#s*ayatyagni: |

praccha#dayis%yati tama: svapara#tma#nau huta#s*a iva ||36||

yadi ca bhavato matena svapara#tma#nau praka#s*ayatyagni:, nanvida#ni#m% tatprati-

paks%abhu#tam% tamo'pi svapara#tma#nau cha#dayet | na caitad dr%s%t%am | tatra yaduktam-

`svapara#tma#nau praka#s*ayatyagni:' (34 ka#^) iti, tanna ||36||

kin~ca#nyat,

na#sti tamas*ca jvalane yatra ca tis%t%hati para#tmani {1. sada#tmani-ra#^ |} jvalana: |

kurute katham% praka#s*am% sa hi praka#s*o'ndhaka#ravadha: ||37||

iha ca#gnau na#sti tama:, na#pi ca yatra#gnistatra#sti tama: | praka#s*as*ca

na#ma tamasa: pratigha#ta: | yasma#cca#gnau na#sti tamo na#pi ca yatra#gnistatra#sti

tama:, tatra kasya tamasa: pratigha#tamagni: karoti yasya pratigha#ta#dagni:

svapara#tma#nau praka#s*ayati#ti ! ||37||

atra#ha-nanu yasma#devam% na#gnau tamo'sti, na#pi yatra#gnistatra tamo'sti,

tasma#deva svapara#tma#nau na praka#s*ayatyagni:; kuta: ? tena hyutpadyama#nenaiva#gnina#

tamasa: pratigha#ta: | tasma#nna#gnau tamo'sti, na#pi yatra#gnistatra tamo'sti,

yasma#dutpadyama#nam% evobhayam% praka#s*ayatyagni:-sva#tma#nam% para#tma#nam% ceti ?

atrocyate-

utpadyama#na eva praka#s*atyagnirityasadva#da: |

utpadyama#na eva pra#pnoti tamo na hi huta#s*a: ||38||

ayamagnirutpadyama#na eva praka#s*ayati sva#tma#nam% para#tma#nam% ca iti na#ya-

mupapadyate va#da: | kasma#t ? na hyutpadyama#na eva#gnistama: pra#pnoti, apra#pta-

tva#nnaivopahanti, tamasas*ca#nupagha#ta#nna#sti praka#s*a: ||38||

@055

kin~ca#nyat,

apra#pto'pi jvalano yadi va# punarandhaka#ramupahanya#t |

sarves%u lokadha#tus%u tamo'yamiha sam%sthito hanya#t ||39||

atha#pi manyase-apra#pto'pyagnirandhaka#ramupahanti#ti ? nanvida#ni#miha

sam%sthito'gni: sarvalokadha#tusthamupahanis%yati tamastulya#ya#mapra#ptau | na caitadevam%

dr%s%t%am | tasma#dapra#pyaiva#gnirandhaka#ramupahanti#ti yadis%t%am% tanna ||39||

(ga) na prameyata: prama#n%asiddhi:

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi svatas*ca prama#n%asiddhiranapeks%ya tava prameya#n%i |

bhavati prama#n%asiddhirna para#peks%a# svata: {1. hi-ra#^ |} siddhi: ||40||

yadi ca#gnivat svata: prama#n%asiddhiriti manyase, anapeks%ya#pi prameya#nartha#n

prama#n%a#na#m% prasiddhirbhavis%yati | kim% ka#ran%am ? na hi svata: siddhi:

paramapeks%ate ! atha#peks%ate, na svata: siddhi: ! ||40||

atra#ha-yadi na#peks%ante prameya#nartha#n prama#n%a#ni, ko dos%o bhavis%yati#ti ?

atrocyate-

anapeks%ya hi prameya#nartha#n yadi te prama#n%asiddhiriti {2. ^siddhi: bhavati-ra#^ |} |

na bhavanti kasyacidevamima#ni ta#ni {3. ra#^ pustake na#sti |} prama#n%a#ni ||41||

yadi prameya#nartha#nanapeks%ya prasiddhirbhavati prama#n%a#na#miti, evam% ta#ni#ma#ni

prama#n%a#ni na kasyacit prama#n%a#ni bhavanti | evam% dos%a: |

atha kasyacidbhavanti prama#n%a#ni, naiveda#ni#manapeks%ya {4. ta#n-ityadhikam% pa#t%ham% va#n~chati ra#^ |} prameya#nartha#n prama#-

n%a#ni bhavanti ||41||

atha matamapeks%ya siddhistes%a#mityatra bhavati ko dos%a: |

siddhasya sa#dhanam% sya#nna#siddho'peks%ate hyanyat ||42||

atha#pi matam-apeks%ya prameya#nartha#n prama#n%a#na#m% siddhirbhavati#ti, evam%

siddhasya prama#n%acatus%t%ayasya sa#dhanam% bhavati | kim% ka#ran%am ? na hyasiddhasya#rtha-

sya#peks%an%am% bhavati | na hyasiddho devadatta: kan~cidarthamapeks%ate | na ca siddhasya

sa#dhanamis%t%am, kr%tasya ka#ran%a#nupapatteriti ||42||

@056

kin~ca#nyat,

sidhyanti hi prameya#n%yapeks%ya yadi sarvatha# prama#n%a#ni |

bhavati prameyasiddhirna#peks%yaiva {1. ranapeks%yaiva-ra#^ |} prama#n%a#ni ||43||

yadi prameya#n%yapeks%ya prama#n%a#ni sidhyanti, neda#ni#m% prama#n%a#nyapeks%ya prame-

ya#n%i sidhyanti | kim% ka#ran%am ? na hi sa#dhyam% sa#dhanam% sa#dhayati, sa#dhana#ni

ca kila prameya#n%a#m% prama#n%a#ni ||43||

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca prameyasiddhirna#peks%yaiva {1. ranapeks%yaiva-ra#^ |} bhavati prama#n%a#ni |

kim% te prama#n%asiddhya# ta#ni yadartha prasiddham% tat ||44||

yadi ca manyase-anapeks%yaiva prama#n%a#ni prameya#n%a#m% prasiddhirbhavati#ti, kimi-

da#ni#m% te prama#n%asiddhya# paryanvis%t%ya# | kim% ka#ran%am ? yadartha hi ta#ni prama#-

n%a#ni paryanvis%yeran te prameya# artha# vina#pi prama#n%ai: siddha#: | tatra kim% prama#n%ai:

kr%tyam ! ||44||

atha tu prama#n%asiddhirbhavatyapeks%yaiva te prameya#n%i |

vyatyaya evam% sati te dhruvam% prama#n%aprameya#n%a#m ||45||

atha#pi manyase-apeks%yaiva prameya#nartha#n prama#n%a#ni bhavanti#ti, ma# bhu#t

pu#rvoktados%a iti kr%tva#, evam% te sati vyatyaya: prama#n%aprameya#n%a#m% bhavati | prama#-

n%a#ni te prameya#n%i bhavanti, prameyai: sa#dhitatva#t | prameya#n%i ca prama#n%a#ni

bhavanti, prama#n%a#na#m% sa#dhakatva#t ||45|| atha te prama#n%asiddhya# prameyasiddhi: prameyasiddhya# ca |

bhavati prama#n%asiddhirna#styubhayasya#pi te siddhi: ||46||

atha manyase-prama#n%asiddhya# prameyasiddhirbhavati prama#n%a#peks%atva#t, prameya-

siddhya# ca prama#n%asiddhirbhavati prameya#peks%atva#diti, evam% te satyubhayasya#pi

siddhirna bhavati | kim% ka#ran%am ? ||46||

sidhyanti hi prama#n%airyadi prameya#n%i ta#ni taireva |

sa#dhya#ni ca prameyaista#ni katham% sa#dhayis%yanti ||47||

yadi hi prama#n%ai: prameya#n%i sidhyanti, ta#ni ca prama#n%a#ni taireva prameyai:

sa#dhayitavya#ni, nanvasiddhes%u prameyes%u ka#ran%asya#siddhatva#dasiddha#ni katham% sa#dha-

yis%yanti prameya#n%i ! ||47||

@057

sidhyanti ca prameyairyadi prama#n%a#ni ta#ni taireva |

sa#dhya#ni ca prama#n%aista#ni katham% sa#dhayis%yanti ! ||48||

yadi ca prameyai: prama#n%a#ni sidhyanti, ta#ni ca prameya#n%i taireva prama#n%ai:

sa#dhayitavya#ni ? nanvasiddhes%u prama#n%es%u ka#ran%asya#siddhatva#dasiddha#ni katham%

sa#dhyis%yanti prama#n%a#ni ! ||48||

pitra# yadyutpa#dya: putro yadi tena caiva putren%a |

utpa#dya: sa yadi pita# vada tatrotpa#dayati ka: kam ! ||49||

yatha#pi na#ma kas*cid bru#ya#t-`pitra# putra utpa#dani#ya:, sa ca pita# tenaiva

putren%otpa#dani#ya:' iti, tatreda#ni#m% vru#hi-kena ka utpa#dayitavya iti ! tathaiva

khalu bhava#n bravi#ti-`prama#n%ai: prameya#n%i sa#dhayitavya#ni, ta#nyeva ca puna: prama#-

n%a#ni taireva prameyai:' iti, tatreda#ni#m% te katamai: katama#ni sa#dhayitavya#ni ! ||

kas*ca pita# ka: putrastatra tvam% bru#hi ta#vubha#vapi ca |

pita#putralaks%an%adharau yato bhavati no'tra {1. na putra sandeha:-ra#^ |} sam%deha: ||50||

tayos*ca pu#rvopadis%t%ayo: pita#putrayo: vada-katara: putra: katara: pita# ? ubha#vapi

ta#vutpa#dakatva#t pitr%laks%an%adharau, utpa#dyatva#cca putralaks%an%adharau | atra na: sam%deho

bhavati-katarastatra pita# katara: putra iti ? evameva ya#nyeta#ni bhavata:

prama#n%aprameya#n%i, tatra katara#n%i prama#n%a#ni, katara#n%i prameya#n%i ? ubhaya#nyapi

hyeta#ni sa#dhakatva#t prama#n%a#ni, sa#dhyatva#t prameya#n%i | atra na: sandeho

bhavati-katara#n%yatra prama#n%a#ni, katara#n%i prameya#n%i#ti ? ||50||

(gha) na#pyakasma#t prama#n%asiddhi:

naiva svata: prasiddhirna parasparata: paraprama#n%airva# |

na bhavati na ca prameyairna ca#pyakasma#t prama#n%a#na#m ||51||

na svata: prasiddhi: pratyaks%asya tenaiva pratyaks%en%a,

anuma#nasya tenaiva#numa#nena, upama#nasya tenaivopama#nena,

a#gamasya tenaiva#gamena | na#pi parasparata:-pratyaks%a-

sya#numa#nopama#na#gamai:, anuma#nasya pratyaks%opama#na#gamai:, upama#nasya pratyaks%a#-

numa#na#gamai:, a#gamasya pratyaks%a#numa#nopama#nai:, na#pi pratyaks%a#numa#nopama#na#-

gama#na#manyai: pratyaks%a#numa#nopama#na#gamairyatha#svam |

na#pi prameyai: samastavyastai: svavis%ayaparavis%ayasam%gr%hi#tai: | na#pyakasma#t,

na#pi samuccayenaites%a#m% ka#ran%a#na#m% pu#rvoddis%t%a#na#m% vim%s*attris*accatva#rim%s*ats%ad%-

vim%s*ate (?)rva# {2. vim%s*at^ vim%s*atirva#-ra#^ |} |

@058

tatra yaduktam-`prama#n%a#dhigamyatva#t prameya#n%a#m% bha#va#na#m% santi ca te prameya#

bha#va#sta#ni ca prama#n%a#ni yaiste prama#n%ai: prameya#bha#va#: samadhigata#:' iti, tanna ||

2. ito'pi bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyata# yukta# (kha)

(1) prati#tyasamutpannatva#t

yatpurnabhavatoktam-

kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% dharma#vastha#vidas*ca manyante |

kus*alam% jana#: svabha#vam% s*es%es%vapyes%a viniyoga: || (7 ka#^) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% dharma#vastha#vido bruvanti yadi |

kus*alam% svabha#vamevam% pravibha#gena#bhidheya: sya#t ||52||

kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% dharma#vastha#vida: kus*alam% svabha#vam% manyante | sa ca bhavata#

pravibha#genopades%t%avya: sya#t-ayam% sa kus*ala: svabha#va:, ime te kus*ala# dharma#:,

idam% tatkus*alam% vijn~a#nam, ayam% sa kus*alavijn~a#nasvabha#va: | evam% sarves%a#m | na

caitadevam% dr%s%t%am | tasma#dyaduktam- `yatha#svamupadis%t%a: svabha#vo dharma#n%a#m' iti,

tanna ||52||

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca prati#tya kus*ala: svabha#va utpadyate sa kus*ala#na#m |

dharma#n%a#m% parabha#va: svabha#va evam% katham% bhavati ! ||53||

yadi ca kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% svabha#vo hetupratyayasa#magri#m% prati#tyotpadyate, sa

parabha#va#dutpanna: kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% katham% svabha#vo bhavati ! evameva#kus*alaprabhr%-

ti#na#m | tatra yaduktam-`kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% kus*ala: svabha#vo'pyupadis%t%a:,

evama kus*ala#di#na#m% ca#kus*ala#di:' iti, tanna ||53||

kin~ca#nyat,

atha na prati#tya kin~cit svabha#va utpadyate sa kus*ala#na#m |

dharma#n%a#mevam% sya#d va#so na brahmacaryasya ||54||

atha manyase-na kin~citprati#tya kus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#m% kus*ala: svabha#va

utpadyate, evamakus*ala#na#m% dharma#n%a#makus*ala:, avya#kr%ta#na#mavya#kr%ta iti ? evam%

satyabrahmacaryava#so bhavati | kim% ka#ran%am ? prati#tyasamutpa#dasya hyevam% sati pratya#-

khya#nam% bhavati, prati#tyasamutpa#dasya pratya#khya#na#t prati#tyasamutpa#dadars*anapratya#-

khya#nam% bhavati | na hyavidyama#nasya prati#tyasamutpa#dasya dars*anamupapadyama#nam% bhavati |

@059

asati prati#tyasamutpa#dadars*ane dharmadars*anam% na bhavati | uktam% hi bhagavata#-"yo

hi, bhiks%ava:, prati#tyasamutpa#dam% pas*yati sa dharma pas*yati" ( ) iti |

dharmadars*ana#bha#va#d brahmacaryava#sa#bha#va: |

athava#-prati#tyasamutpa#dapratya#khya#na#t du:khasamudayapratya#khya#nam% bhavati |

prati#tyasamutpa#do hi du:khasya samudaya: | du:khasamudayasya pratya#khya#na#d du:kha-

pratya#khya#nam% bhavati | asati hi samudaye tatkuto du:kham% samudes%yati ! du:khapratya#-

khya#na#t samudayapratya#khya#na#cca du:khanirodhasya pratya#khya#nam% bhavati {1. ra#^ pustake na#sti |} | asati

hi du:khasamudaye kasya prahan%a#nnirodho bhavis%yati ! (du:khanirodhapratya#khya#na#-

nma#rgasya pratya#khya#nam% bhavati) | asati hi du:khanirodhe kasya pra#ptaye ma#rgo

bhavis%yati du:khanirodhaga#mi# ! evam% caturn%a#ma#ryasatya#na#mabha#va: | tes%a#mabha#-

va#cchra#man%yaphala#bha#va: sampra#pta: | satyadars*ana#cchra#man%yaphala#ni hi samadhi-

gamyante | s*ra#man%yaphala#na#mabha#va#dabrahmacaryava#sa iti ||54||

kin~ca#nyat,

na#dharmo dharmo va# sam%vyavaha#ras*ca laukika# na syu: |

nitya#s*ca sasvabha#va# syurnityatva#dahetumata: ||55||

eva sati prati#tyasamutpa#dam% pratya#caks%a#n%asya bhavata: ko dos%a: prasajyate ?

dharmo na bhavati, adharmo na bhavati, sam%vyavaha#ra#s*ca laukika# na bhavanti | kim%

ka#ran%am ? prati#tyasamutpannam% hyetatsarvamasti, prati#tyasamutpa#de kuto bhavis%yati !

api ca sasvabha#vo'prati#tyasamutpanno nirhetuko nitya: sya#t | kim% ka#ran%am ?

nirhetuka# hi bha#va# nitya#: | sa eva ca#brahmacaryava#sa: prasajyate, svasiddha#nta-

virodhas*ca | kim% ka#ran%am ? anitya# hi bhagavata# sarvasam%ska#ra# nirdis%t%a#: |

te sasvabha#vanityatva#nnitya# hi bhavanti ||55||

es%a ca#kus*ales%vavya#kr%tes%u {2. evamakus*ale^-mu^ pustake pa#t%ha: |} nairya#n%ika#dis%u ca dos%a: |

tasma#t sarva sam%skr%tamasam%skr%tam% te bhavatyeva ||56||

yas*cais%a kus*ales%u nirdis%t%a: kalpa: sa eva#kus*ales%u, sa eva#vya#kr%tes%u, sa

eva nairya#n%ikaprabhr%tis%u | tasma#tte sarvamidam% sam%skr%tamasam%skr%tam% sampadyate | kim%

ka#ran%am ? hetau hyasatyutpa#dasthitibhan*ga# na bhavanti | utpa#dasthitibhan*ges%va-

satsu sam%skr%talaks%an%a#bha#va#t sarva sam%skr%tamasam%skr%tam% sampadyate | tatra yaduktam-

`kus*ala#di#na#m% bha#va#na#m% svabha#vasadbha#va#das*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna ||56||

@060

(2) nirvastukasya na#ma#bha#ve'niyama#t

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

yadi ca na bhavet svabha#vo dharma#n%a#m% ni:svabha#va ityeva |

na#ma#pi bhavennaivam% na#ma hi nirvastukam% na#sti || (9 ka#^) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

ya: sadbhu#tam% na#ma#tra bru#ya#t sasvabha#va ityevam |

bhavata# prativaktavyo na#ma bru#mas*ca na vayam% sat {1. tat-mu^ |} ||57||

yo na#ma#tra sadbhu#tam% bru#ya#t sasvabha#va iti, sa bhavata# prativaktavya: sya#t-

yasya sadbhu#tam% na#ma svabha#vasya, tasma#ttena#pi svabha#vena sadbhu#tena bhavitavyam |

na hyasadbhu#tasya svabha#vasya sadbhu#tam% na#ma bhavati#ti | na punarvayam% na#ma sadbhu#tam%

bru#ma: | tadapi hi bha#vasvabha#vasya#bha#va#nna#ma ni:svabha#vam, tasma#cchu#nyam,

s*u#nyatva#dasadbhu#tam | tatra yad bhavatoktam-`na#masadbha#va#t sadbhu#ta: svabha#va:'

iti, tanna ||57||

kin~ca#nyat,

na#ma#saditi ca yadidam% tatkim% nu sato bhavatyuta#pyasata: |

yadi hi sato yadyasato dvidha#pi te hi#yate va#da: ||58||

yaccaitanna#ma#saditi, tatkim% sato'sato va# ? yadi hi satastanna#ma, yadya-

sata:-ubhayatha#pi pratijn~a# hi#yate | tatra yadi ta#vatsato na#ma#saditi pratijn~a#

hi#yate, na hi#da#ni#m% tadasadida#ni#m% sat | atha#sato'saditi na#ma, asadbhu#tasya

na#ma na bhavati | tasma#dya# pratijn~a#-`na#mna: sadbhu#ta: svabha#va:' iti, sa#

hi#na# ||58||

kin~ca#nyat,

sarves%a#m% bha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatvam% copapa#ditam% pu#rvam |

sa upa#lambhastasma#d bhavatyayam% ca#pratijn~a#ya#: ||59||

iha ca#sma#bhi: pu#rvameva sarves%a#m% bha#va#na#m% vistarata: s*u#nyatvamupapa#ditam |

tatra pra#n*na#mno'pi s*u#nyatvamuktam | sa bhava#nas*u#nyatvam% {2. sambhavam% as*u#nyatvam%-ra#^ |} parigr%hya parivr%tto

vaktum-yadi bha#va#na#m% svabha#vo na sya#dasvabha#va iti na#ma#pi#dam% na sya#diti,

tasma#dapratijn~opa#lambho'yam% bhavata: sampadyate | na hi vayam% na#ma sadbhu#tamiti

bru#ma: ||59||

@061

(ka) dharmavinirmukta: svabha#va: pratis%iddha:

yatpunarbhavatoktam

atha vidyate svabha#va: sa ca dharma#n%a#m% na vidyate tasma#t |

dharmairvina# svabha#va: yasya tadyuktamupades%t%um || (ka#^ 10) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

atha vidyate svabha#va: sa ca dharma#n%a#m% na vidyata iti#dam |

a#s*an*kitam% yaduktam% bhavatyana#s*an*kitam% tacca ||60||

atha hi vayam% dharma#n%a#m% svabha#vam% pratis%edhaya#ma:, dharmavinirmuktasya va# kasya-

cidarthasya svabha#vamabhyupagaccha#ma: | nanvevam% sati ya upa#lambho bhavata:-`yadi

dharma# ni:svabha#va#:, kasya khalvida#ni#manyasya#rthasya dharmavinirmuktasya sva- bha#vo bhavati, sa yuktamupades%t%um' iti, du#ra#pakr%s%t%amevaitadbhavati, upalambho na

bhavati ||60||

(kha) asato'pyanabhyupagamasya pratis%edha#t sama:

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

sata eva pratis%edho na#sti ghat%o geha ityayam% yasma#t |

dr%s%t%a: pratis%edho'yam% sata: svabha#vasya te tasma#t || (ka#^ 11) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

sata eva pratis%edho yadi s*u#nyatvam% nanu prasiddhamidam |

pratis%edhayate hi bhava#n bha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#vatvam ||61||

yadi sata eva pratis%edho bhavati na#sata:, bhava#m%^s*ca sarvabha#va#na#m% ni:sva-

bha#vatvam% pratis%edhayati, nanu prasiddham% sarvabha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#vatvam | tvadvacanena

pratis%edhasadbha#va#t, ni:svabha#vatvasya ca sarvabha#va#na#m% pratis%iddhatva#t prasiddha#

s*u#nyata# ||61||

pratis%edhayase'tha tvam% s*u#nyatvam% tacca na#sti s*u#nyatvam |

pratis%edha: sata iti te nanves%a vihi#yate va#da: ||62||

atha pratis%edhayasi tvam% sarvabha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#va#na#m% s*u#nyatvam, na#sti tacca

s*u#nyatvam, ya# tarhi te pratijn~a#-`sata: pratis%edho bhavati na#sata:' iti, sa#

hi#na# ||62||

kin~ca#nyat, 

pratis%edhaya#mi na#ham% kin~cit pratis%edhyamasti na ca kin~cit |

tasma#t pratis%edhayasi#tyadhilaya {1. avilaya: = pu#ja# ityartha: |} es%a tvaya# kriyate ||63||

@062

yadyaham% kin~citpratis%edhaya#mi tatastadapi tvaya# yuktameva vaktum% sya#t | na

caiva#ham% kin~cit pratis%edhaya#mi, yasma#nna kin~citpratis%eddhavyamasti | tasma#-

cchu#nyes%u sarvabha#ves%vavidyama#ne pratis%edhye pratis%edhe ca pratis%edhayasi#tyes%u tvaya#

prastuta: so'dhilaya: kriyata iti ||63||

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

atha na#sti sa svabha#va: kim% nu pratis%idhyate tvaya#nena |

vacanenarte vacana#tpratis%edha: sidhyati hyasata: || (ka#^ 12) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

yacca#harte vacana#dasata: pratis%edhavacana#siddhiriti |

atra jn~a#payate va#gasaditi tanna tacca na prati nihanti ||64||

yacca bhava#n bravi#ti-r%te'pi vacana#dasata: pratis%edha: prasiddha:, tatra kim%

`ni:svabha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' ityetattvadvacanam% karoti#ti ? atra bru#ma:-`ni:sva-

bha#va#: sarvabha#va#:' ityetatkhalu vacanam% na ni:svabha#va#neva sarvabha#va#n karoti;

kintu `asati svabha#ve bha#va# ni:svabha#va#:' iti jn~a#payati | tadyatha# kas*cid

bru#ya#davidyama#nagr%he devadatte-`asti gr%he devadatta:' iti, tatrainam% kas*citprati-

bru#ya#t-na#sti#ti | na tadvacanam% devadattasya#sadbha#vam% karoti, kintu jn~a#payati

kevalamasambhavam% gr%he devadattasya | tadvanna#sti svabha#vo bha#va#na#mityetadvacanam%

na bha#va#na#m% ni:svabha#vatvam% karoti, kintu sarvabha#ves%u svabha#vasya#bha#vam%

jn~a#payati |

tatra yadbhavatoktam `kimasati svabha#ve na#sti svabha#va ityetadvacanam% karoti,

r%te'pi vacana#t prasiddha: svabha#vasya#bha#va:' iti, tanna yuktam ||64||

(ga) prati#tyasamutpannatva#nna nirhetukata#dos%a:

anyacca-

ba#la#na#miva mithya# mr%gatr%s%n%a#ya#m% yatha# jalagra#ha: |

evam% mithya#gra#ha: sya#tte pratis%edhato hyasata: || (13-16 ka#^)

itya#dayo ya# punas*catasro ga#tha# bhavatokta#: ? atra bru#ma:-

mr%gatr%s%n%a#dr%s%t%a#nte ya: punaruktastvaya# maha#m%s*carca: |

tatra#pi nirn%ayam% s*r%n%u yatha# sa dr%s%t%a#nta upapanna: ||65||

ya es%a tvaya# mr%gatr%s%n%a#dr%s%t%a#nte maha#m%s*carca uktastatra#pi yo nirn%aya: sa

s*ru#yata#m% yathopapanna es%a dr%s%t%a#nto bhavati ||65||

@063

sa yadi svabha#vata: sya#d gra#ho na sya#tprati#tya samudbhu#ta: |

yas*ca prati#tya bhavati gra#ho nanu s*u#nyata# saiva ||66||

yadi mr%gatr%s%n%a#ya#m% sa yatha# jalagra#ha: svabha#vata: sya#nna sya#tprati#tyasamu-

tpanna:, yato mr%gatr%s%n%a#m% ca prati#tya vipari#tam% ca dars*anam% prati#tya#yonis*omana-

ska#ram% ca prati#tya sya#dudbhuto'ta: prati#tyasamutpanna: | yatas*ca prati#tyasamutpanno'ta: svabha#vata: s*u#nya eva | yatha# pu#rvamuktam% tatha# ||66||

kin~ca#nyat,

yadi ca svabha#vata: sya#d gra#ha: kastam% nivartayed gra#ham |

s*es%es%vapyes%a vidhistasma#des%o'nupa#lambha: ||67||

yadi ca mr%gatr%s%n%a#ya#m% jalagra#ha: svabha#vata: sya#t, ka eva tam% vinivartayet !

na hi svabha#va: s*akyo vinivartayitum; yatha#gnerus%n%atvamapa#m% dravatvama#ka#s*asya

nira#varan%atvam | dr%s%t%am% ca#sya vinivartanam | tasma#cchu#nyasvabha#vo gra#ha: | yatha#

caitadevam, s*es%es%vapi dharmes%ves%a krama: pratyavagantavyo gra#hyaprabhr%tis%u pan~casu |

tatra yadbhavatoktam-`s%at%kabha#va#das*u#nya#: sarvabha#va#:' iti, tanna ||67||

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

`hetos*ca te na siddhirnai:sva#bha#vya#t kuto hi te hetu: |

nirhetukasya siddhirna copapanna#sya te'rthasya' || (17-19 ka#^) iti ?

atra bru#ma:-

atha te hetvabha#va: pratyukta: pu#rvameva sa samatva#t |

mr%gatr%s%n%a#dr%s%t%a#ntavya#vr%ttividhau ya ukta: pra#k ||68||

etenai ceda#ni#m% carcena pu#rvoktena hetvabha#vo'pi pratyukto'vagantavya: | ya eva

hi carca: pu#rvasmin heta#vukta: s%at%kapratis%edhasya sa eveha#pi carcayitavya: |

(14-15 ka#^) ||68||

(4) pratis%edha-pratis%edha#bhyupagama#dados%a:

yatpunarbhavatoktam-

pu#rvam% cet pratis%edha: pas*ca#t pratis%edhyamityanupapannam | pas*ca#cca#nupapanno yugapacca yata: svabha#va: san {1. svabha#vo'san-ra#^ |} || iti (20 ka#^)

atra bru#ma:-

yastraika#lye hetu: pratyukta: pu#rvameva sa samatva#t |

traika#lyapratihetus*ca s*u#nyata#va#dina#m% pra#pta: ||69||

@064

ya es%a hetustraika#lye pratis%edhava#ci# sa uktottara: pratyavagantavya: |

kasma#t ? sa#dhyasamatva#t | tatha# hi tvadvacanena pratis%edhastraika#lye'nupapanna-

pratis%edhavatsa pratis%edhyo'pi | tasma#t pratis%edhapratis%edhye'sati yadbhava#n

manyate-pratis%edha: pratis%iddha iti, tanna | yastrika#lapratis%edhava#ci# hetu:, es%a

eva s*u#nyata#va#dina#m% pra#pta:; sarvabha#vasvabha#vapratis%edhakatva#t na bhavata: ||69||

athava# kathametaduktottaram ?

pratis%edhya#mi na#ham% kin~cit pratis%edhyamasti na ca kin~cit |

tasma#t pratis%edhayasi#tyadhilaya es%a tvaya# kriyate || (ka#^ 63)

prabhavati ca s*u#nyateyam% yasya prabhavanti tasya sarva#rtha#: |

prabhavati na tasya kin~cinna prabhavati s*u#nyata# yasya ||70||

iti pratyuktam | atha manyase-tris%vapi ka#les%u pratis%edha: siddha:, dr%s%t%a: pu#rva-

ka#li#no'pi hetu:, uttaraka#li#no'pi, yugapatka#li#no'pi hetu:; tatra pu#rvaka#li#no

heturyatha# pita# putrasya, pas*ca#tka#li#no yatha# s*is%ya a#ca#ryasya, yugapatka#li#no

yatha# pradi#pa: praka#s*asyeti ? atra bru#ma:-na caitadevam; ukta# hyetasmin krame

traya: pu#rvados%a#: | api ca yadyevam, pratis%edhasadbha#vastvaya#bhyupagamyate pratijn~a#-

ha#nis*ca te bhavati | etena kramen%a svabha#vapratis%edho'pi siddha: ||70||

bhavati ca#tra-

ya: s*u#nyata#m% prati#tyasamutpa#dam% madhyama#m% pratipadam% ca |

eka#rtham% nijaga#da pran%ama#mi tamapratimasambuddham ||71||

yasya s*u#nyateyam% prabhavati tasya sarva#rtha# laukikalokottara#: prabhavanti | kim%

ka#ran%am ? yasya hi s*u#nyata# prabhavati tasya prati#tyasamutpa#da: prabhavati |

yasya prati#tyasamutpa#da: prabhavati tasya catva#rya#ryasatya#ni prabhavanti | yasya

catva#rya#ryasatya#ni prabhavanti tasya s*ra#man%yaphala#ni prabhavanti, sarvavis*es%a#-

dhigama#: prabhavanti | yasya sarvavis*es%a#dhigama#: prabhavanti, tasya tri#n%i ratna#ni-

buddhadharmasan*gha#:, prabhavanti | yasya prati#tyasamutpa#da: prabhavati tasya dharmo dharma-

heturdharmaphalam% ca prabhavanti, tasya#dharmo'dharmaheturadharmaphalam% ca prabhavanti | yasya

dharma#dharmau dharma#dharmahetu# dharma#dharmaphale ca prabhavanti, tasya kles*a: kles*asamudaya:

kles*avastu#ni ca prabhavanti | yasyaitatsarvam% prabhavati pu#rvoktam% tasya sugatidurgati-

vyavastha#, sugatidurgatigamanam, sugatidurgatiga#mi# ma#rga:, sugatidurgativyati- kraman%am, sugatidurgativyatikramopa#ya:, sarvasam%vyavaha#ra#s*ca laukika# vyavastha#- o pita#: svayamadhigantavya#: | anaya# dis*a# kin~cicchakyam% vacanenopades%t%umiti || * iti kr%tiriyama#ca#ryana#ga#rjunapa#da#na#m *